Hmm . . this might improve our prospects for getting AAV-7s.

U.S. Extends SDD Phase of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
Posted 27-Jul-2005 09:05

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/0...x.php#orison_mc

General Dynamics Amphibious Systems in Woodbridge, VA received a $42.9 million cost-reimbursable addition to a previously awarded contract (N67854-01-C-0001) to extend the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle's systems development and demonstration (SDD) phase. Full-up system live fire testing will be included. General Dynamics will provide all required materials, services, personnel and facilities to complete the design and development of the EFV, perform studies and analyses, manufacture and test all SDD prototypes, prepare for production, initiate logistics support of the EFV, and successfully complete the SDD phase.

The USMC intends to replace their AAV Amtracs with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. The EFV is the top land acquisition priority of the U.S. Marine Corps, with a number of new capabilities...

The EFV is expected to have a water speed of more than 20 knots - three times that of the AAV-7s - and a land speed of about 45 miles per hour which would be comparable to an AAV RAM/RS and render the EFV able to keep up with M1 tanks.

The personnel version will have a high-tech weapons station with a 30mm cannon to replace the AAV's .50 caliber machine gun, and carry a crew of three plus 17 combat-loaded Marines. A command vehicle will carry an array of communications and computer systems and staff personnel, and all EFVs will be equipped with a new upgradeable embedded computing architecture that addresses obsolescence.

The Marines hope to buy 1,013 EFVs to replace 1,322 AAVs, and the EFV remains the U.S. Marines' #1 vehicle priority. The program is using a number of improved project management and procurement innovations, and full up System Level Lethality testing is planned to begin in FY 2006. Low-rate initial production vehicles would be delivered in FY 2007 and FY 2008 for use during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E), Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is scheduled to occur in FY 2008, and Full Operational Capability (FOC) will occur in FY 2018.

As one can see from this schedule, however, it is possible that further upgrades and/or life-extension programs may be required for the AAV fleet beyond those currently anticipated.

Work on this contract will be performed in Virginia (21.22%); Indiana (12.47%); Germany (10.47%); Michigan (8.87%); North Carolina (6.81%); California (5.31%); Ohio (5.21%); Washington (5.20%); Maryland (4.38%); Minnesota (4.38%); Colorado (2.95%); Canada (2.53%); Illinois (2.37%); Arizona (1.07%); New York (0.87%); Alabama (0.54%); Florida (0.48%); Georgia (0.14%); Texas (0.13%); and undetermined (4.61%). Work is expected to be completed by September 2009.

The Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, VA issued the contract addition.

Maybe we'll start seeing some of these old AAV7s come in for our marines in the next few years. Iraq and Afghanistan, their top priorities for the US to arm, don't have marines anway, right, and another priority, Colombia needs more airborne transport for its vast interior.

These old AAV7s would need some kind of up-armoring, though. Just in recent weeks, there has been news of at least a couple of these being literally torn apart by IEDs with entire 13-14-man USMC squads plus crew inside, with horrific consequences. Not to mention being fat but relatively thin-skinned targets for RPGs.

We can get some free surplus, why not. But maybe a smaller vehicle like the Arisgator or Amphigavin, M113-derived but with enhanced amphibious capabiliy plus one of many up-armor packages available for the M113 would actually be a better fit (of course, again, only if we had the funds to make such a choice). :dunno:

What it looks like

:wow: Looks like a Shaq O-Neil version of the M-113.

wow, sana nga magkatotoo... :thumb:

HOw many pieces OF LVTP-7(AAV-7) required by our Marines??? The only weakness is the thin armor surrounding the AAV-7. Hope our Marines will be driving this amphibious vehicle in a not too distant future...Peace to all.

Theres a limitation to uparmoring the AAV or else it becomes too heavy and becomes a dead submarine once launched from the assault ship.

remember the 14 Ohio marines that died in an IED explosion, that AAV7 looked like it imploded

Imploded? It was blasted by an IED based on 500lb bomb.

just over-expressing :armywink:

So, AAVP-7 cannot operate in hostile area wherein you can expect to have a lot of flying RPG-7 rockets. One AAVP-7 hit by RPG-7 will cost too much for us, because it can carry 25 marines inside. Peace to all.

AAVs are designed for beach assaults only launching from assault ships offshore, the marines are expected to exit the hell out once the AAVs hit the shore so the vehicles can return to the asault ship and retrieve other Marines, its not designed for extended patrols inland and is eveidently light armored and lightly armed.

The USMC seem to think their AAVs are their all-purpose infantry carriers, from beach landings to deep inland, or else they wouldn't have designed it to be "able to keep up with M1 tanks" as the article says.

the AAV P7 were designed in the '70s (PMC still has the P5's). Thier new AAAVs designed to replace the P7s are intended to keep up with the M-1's which they also utilize. AAV's are primarily intendend for ship to shore movevents for forcible entries in heavily defended beaches. Thier secondary role is as APC in sustained inland operations in our marine terminology. Added protection may be added to the AAV's when they do land and shift to thier seconadary role as APC as applique armor for better protection against the enemies anti armor assets.

if they're up-armoring (and thus adding weight to) those AAV-7s to allow them to accompany Marines "all the way" instead of just putting them on the beach, wouldn't it also be possible to mount a fire support or mortar turret (or under-armor mortar) for operators who don't have MBTs?

how about surplus vehicles from other services? has the PMC looked at, say, French AMX-10RCs?

the AMX-10RC is more of a FSV than a troop carrier

and the PMC needs more FSVs.

as far as ground operations are concerned, i am a traditionalist, a firm believer in the doctrine that infantry should stick to being infantry, not passengers: on the battlefield, infantry should rely on terrain, not armor, for cover. armored vehicles should stick to their WWI role of being mobile fortresses, not glorified taxicabs, armored vehicles should deliver overwhelming firepower, not potential casualties, to the battlefield. technology should be harnessed in the service of strategic and tactical goals, not personal comfort.

troop carrying, stick to trucks, then dismount. AAVs, the USMC needs them because of their nation's global commitments, which may bring them to places where they are not welcome - on the other hand, what are the prospects of the PMC storming contested beaches anytime soon? the USMC needs AAVs because they might not always have the luxury of prepositioning or a lengthy window for deployment, the PMC is already positioned and deployed in the areas threatened by the terrs, they need only firepower not transportation to take the battle to the enemy should the opportunity arise.

as far as vehicles are concerned, instead of an AAV acquisition program, rather see the PMC

1. institutionalize its truck modification efforts, take it in directions aside from up-armoring (like alternative fuel powerplants, engine and chassis upgrades, or, jointly with the PA, licence production of a suitable design with private industry), the economic benefits should be obvious.

2. acquire more FSVs or drop-in turrets (heavy-caliber both direct and indirect fire, MGs/AGLs with remote or under-armor control) to mount on existing AFVs, research applique armor, and explore the feasibility of heavier weapons platforms like surplus MBTs, the goal being a small but nonetheless decisive force.

more trucks, proportionately fewer but more effective AFVs.

Blitzkreig tactics made armored taxicabs necessary so that infantry would not be left behind when armored units broke through enemy lines. Combined arms teams require that both infantry and armored units be present. If armor slows down so that the infantry can keep up, then you lose the initiative.

The equation, of course, is a very different when using armor in a COIN campaign.

I agree with mr. possible, we need more FSVs than we need AAVs, current PMC operations tell so. The PMC still has to assault a defended beach, they disembark from their LSTs off piers and wharves with no resistance and roll off to their camps - initiating patrols and assaults from there.

The only scenario where they need AAVs is if they attempt to retake Chinese-occupied islands in the Spratlys. Maybe later, when the AFP has the capability to shift to a more external threat stance, but now, AAVs shouldn't be the priority.

the aavp-7's must be used strictly as landing vehicles, and the V300 commandos as APC's which it was designed for... :armyroleyes:
and get V300's with 25mm cannon turret.
and as they said up there more FSV's...

I disagree. numerous misconceptions abound about combined arms doctrines: the word “blitzkrieg” was never a German military term nor were high-paced operations ever a prerequisite in German military planning, both the word and the concept of “lightning war” were purely creations of Allied media in reaction to the perceived “unprecedented” rapid conquests achieved by panzer-led Wehrmacht formations in the early days of WW II. in reality what they were witnessing were not tanks racing across the countryside at high speed, instead it was the logical outcome of harnessing the technology of the 20th century to a combination of a) the march tactics practiced by the Roman legions since the time of Marius and Caesar, who both stressed not only the mobility of the fighting arms but more importantly that of the all-important logistical element, and b) the exhaustively-prepared expeditions of the Mongols led by Genghis Khan and his successors, who considered the ability of the terrain to support the passage of their hordes of overriding importance.

true, the textbooks show German tanks advancing in the company of infantry, but the reality is actually the other way around: German infantry advanced in the company of tanks, there were no armored personnel carriers in the Wehrmacht, every stormtooper dismounted from a truck. on the battlefield, the German tanks made it a point to never move faster than the German infantry could move forward. and while all that the press saw were the intimidating lines of panzers in front, only the militarily astute saw the greater numbers of tanks in the rear, acting as rolling fortresses along the flanks of the even more numerous columns of trucks moving down the middle of corridors of steel: the German military machine moved as one, points of attack were chosen on the basis of access to roads and terrain suitable to the movement of wheeled rather than tracked vehicles, before and after a breakthrough has been achieved (what’s the point of tanks running on tracks in the first place? so that the roads could be saved for the trucks).

this strategy of concentrating one’s forces only in areas where, due to meticulous attention given to facilitating ease of movement in and out of those zones - and, conversely, the relative difficulty of reaching those massing points from outside the intended axis of advance (adding another layer of defense to one’s flanks: after all, who’s got the roads?) - they would not be exposed for long to potential enemy attacks (and therefore preserved from being prematurely expended before the significant phase of the planned operation), along with the use of deception to mask the true locations of key German units, all but guaranteed that these carefully assembled formations would arrive intact and operate cohesively once the attack is launched, also ensuring that there would be no timely response to the constant stream of full-strength German units being funneled down to and through the point of attack.

thus, the so-called “blitzkrieg” was more an observation of the slowness of the Allied reaction than the rapidity of the German incursions, a “slowness” which was not accidental but rather an outcome that the Allies couldn’t prevent because the German strategy had placed them in that position – the reason why many have observed that the Allies were already beaten before the Germans entered their borders.

in sum, the Germans moved only where their trucks could go and only as far and as fast as these trucks could carry their infantry and their supplies, each advance by the panzers was as deliberate as a move in a high-quality game of chess, not an all-out race in the name of speed. a side secures and sustains the strategic initiative by sound planning before a conflict is initiated, not by simply trying to run faster than the enemy when he is already shooting back.

the German strategy was not a concession to ergonomics or even economics, this was a realistic response to the lessons of history, from time immemorial there have been commanders who thought they had figured-out a way around the one constant in every battle ever fought: terrain. from Crassus who thought he could take the most disciplined army in history to pursue an elusive enemy across the desert - to, ultimately, the German Fuhrer who thought he could successfully gamble against a certain Russian general whose victim a century previous was another would-be European dictator.

today, we are seeing the same mistakes being repeated by commanders who think they can magically beat the odds by coming up with brilliant inventions like Bradleys, BMPs and Strikers. what they are actually accomplishing is burdening their logistical trains with more vehicles to carry fuel, ammunition, spare tires and treads for - while leaving the precious trucks even further behind the leading elements because now the infantry can (supposedly) move as fast as the tanks over terrain that the trucks can’t cross. because adding armored vehicles means the trucks need to carry more, and because the infantry’s newfound speed of advance means the tanks need to stop more often to allow the trucks to catch up, the net effect is to slow down an army’s advance compared to simply sticking with the trucks.

where the Germans by applying technology to proven strategy found success, present-day planners are spending billions on technology without the benefit of a sound concept to build around of. guess where that thought leads to.

as for the COIN equation

I agree with mr. Wardog's observations, the PMC has the benefit of facilities where they can disembark, organize and move to their intended assignment. and I also don't believe in acquiring an expensive platform whose true utility isn't likely to be realized given current concerns, if you want a ship-to-shore ferry get a bunch of RHIBs, small landing craft or CB90s, all of which can do double-duty as general-purpose transports or (in the case of the CB90) patrol platforms. as for armor, again, get more FSVs and the other options described.

as adroth would say, put out the internal fire before...

Jolo 1974 whereas the town proper was occupied by the MNLF. LSTs with a Marine Battalion Landing Team tried to land at the pier and met with enemy fire - how do you land and reinforce the army? Why the do you want to land there anyway. They expect it and want you too. LSTs are amphibious and can beach in most of the coastal areas. (the Navy's LSVs can't do that since they are RO-RO's - no beaching capability designed for piers). Of course, they landed in maimbung north of Jolo proper where they outflank the MNLF who did not expect it and won the battle. Lessons learned - dont land at the pier - they expect it. Marines are amphibious and use the sea as a manuever space. Dont limit thier capability to piers and docks - thats for the army as a follow up force when the marines do secure thier beachead for sustained operations ashore and build up of combat power from zero. Which we did and retook Jolo proper.

sir MBLT do you have more details about that Jolo battle? :ssalute:

:armyeek: huh? aren't you mistaken?

http://www.dscp.dla.mil (not exactly a pic of a beached BESSON-class, but close enough)

:dontgetit: I thought our LSVs are identical to the Americans'? my understanding is that our LSVs' beaching capabilities are limited by the characteristics of the beach (just like most other LCs) but the capability is certainly there.

so? if the landing was done directly onto the beach by a beached LST as you imply, how does that make the case for ship-to-shore AAVs? if in the Siege of Jolo 1974 the PN was dissuaded from landing on a defended pier, how is that example a rationale for landing on an equally-defended beach? going by your own reasoning, wouldn't the real lesson be that any kind of opposed landing is an instance of "They expect it and want you too"? - you've just made another case against opposed landings ("outflank...did not expect it") in addition to Wardog's.

and in the first place, aren't FSVs like our Cockerill-armed LAVs and the French AMX-10RC amphibious vehicles just like the AAV?

now this is something we could use :thumb:



ENHANCED LOGISTIC SUPPORT VESSEL

improved version of the BESSON-class.

My 2cents worth but wheeled vehicles cannot compare with the amphibious capabilities of tracked vehicles in amphibious capabilities, for one thing the AMX-10RC,and the V-150, V-300 vehicles the PMC has arent dedicated amphibious vehicles. The PMC's V-300 was customized/modified with water jets? or props? that allow it to travel faster in water, the original V-300 design was for the wheels to propel in water and if the PMC's V-150 dont have customized propellers of the V-300, then the main means of propulsion in water is by using the wheels. In the beach, tracks provide better mobility in the sand than 4x4 or 6x6 wheeled vehicle. Most likely wheeled vehicles need calm bodies of water like lakes and calm rivers, and in beach landings, have to be launched close to the beach from LSTs or other large landing ships, or use a landing craft like LCACs, LCUs that carry the vehicle directly into the beach without the wheeled vehicle "having to get wet",this like the USMC and how it deploys its LAV25s. While the AAVP7 and other true dedicated amphibious vehicles-most likely tracked- was meant to be launched from miles out from the sea directly from the USMC/USN's LPD, LSDs, and not need the LCACS or LCUs to "give them a ride" into the beach.

In other notes, lets try to summarize what some people have said in this thread about pro and con of the AAVP7 for the PMC. Pro side say that because the PMC needs an amphibious vehicle because the nation being an archaepeligo will need to "hit the beach" in its operations. The AAVP7 will be great for these amphibious operations since its great amphibious capability and its 20+ marine loading capacity, a dozen of these vehicles can carry a 500-man MBLT in 2 waves or 20or more of them can land an MBLT in the first wave alone. Cons have it that the PMC is often the tip of the spear in ISO and are often engaged in inshore operations where it is wooded, muddy, and forested areas, there a big AAVP7 will make a big target. Also the AAVP7 has thin armor while rebel groups have RPG capability and other heavy weapons including .50caliberHMGs and captured mortars and even maybe even recoiless rifles. To make matters worse the AAVP7s do not have a Fire Support/direct-indirect fire/assault gun versions which are prized weapons in the PMC and AFP's campaigns. This about summarizes the pro and con of the AAVP7?

Why not have both? Get the AAVP7 or other dedicated tracked amphibious APC/landing vehicle and still get FSV vehicles just the same, just as the PMC is already doing. It does not have to be one or the other does it? The Indonesian Marines also conduct inland operations as well as amphibious operations, and they have both an APC and FSV amphibious armour and work with each other. Their Marine APCs force include AMX-10P, BVP-2A, BMP-2, and BTR-50. Their Marine FSV force is made up of AMX-10PAC90, PT-76-2000. Also notice that the Indonesians have tried to streamline the main guns of their Marine FSVs and even their army FSVs, into the 90mm gun, they rejected the 105mm gun because it is too large to be used in jungle, wooded areas which is a good reason. Their Marine AMX-10PAC90, and most or all of their PT-76-2000 upgraded with a 90mm gun, their Army Scorpions and AMX-13s also use the 90mm gun, i dont know about the indonesian army's PT-76 if they were upgraded or not. Now can the AFP adopt something like that where the FSV vehicles in the PMC and PA use the same gun so it streamlines ammunition supply?

Thanks for correcting my history lapse there sir but I'm still of the belief that we don't have much practical use of the AAV7 now and then (if we have the vehicle at the time) as clearly stated by you that the attempt was to dock the LST diect to the pier which was executed successfully at a beach latter.

re: your statement RORO config of PN LSVs make the vessels without beaching capability for pier landing should be clarified by you sir since even civilian RORO ships have ramp interface for disembarking vehicles directly to the pier or wharf.

datu: I don’t see how a need to “hit the beach” is concurrently an argument in favor of the AAV-7 since the PN already has ships that can directly offload onto the beach. unless the AAVs can swim from Zamboanga all the way to Patikul, these bulky vehicles will only be hogging-space aboard our limited no. of naval transports to no real advantage.

come to think of it, don't AAVs need specialized ships to disembark them offshore? - I don't know if the BRP BACOLOD CITY and BRP DAGUPAN CITY are of the semi-submersible configuration which would conceivably allow the cargo bay to be flooded and any embarked amphibians to swim out (like an LPD with a floodable well deck) but if this is not the case then the PN also needs to acquire an LPD to operate AAVs else the point is moot.

speaking of maximizing our limited transport capacity, wouldn’t a better solution be to reserve the LSVs for the vehicles and supplies and embark the infantry on civilian ferries? – during beach landings the Marines would simply transfer offshore onto accompanying seagoing landing craft, RHIBs or even motor bancas and zip to the beach where the FSVs and their overland transport are waiting for them. or you could land the infantry first if the presence of nasties can’t be ruled out – since inter-island bancas are presumably faster than AAVs on water, this also reduces transit time hence similarly reducing vulnerability to shore fire.

you forget one argument against AAVs, that is, justifying the need to undertake opposed landings in the first place. as graciously pointed-out by mblt, “outflank” instead of doing what the opposition expects you to do (like in Kuwait 1991). perhaps the presence of a severely-restricted front as in an enemy-held Spratlys-size island would make Gallipoli/D-Day type disembarkations tactically unavoidable, but again as Wardog said what is the likelihood of that scenario panning out and what is its relevance with regard to internal operations?

as for your suggestion of standardizing on a common caliber, I wholeheartedly agree since that meshes perfectly with my assertion that armored vehicles should always be heavy-firepower delivery platforms and not over-garnished taxicabs. but then I go further, why not standardize on a single type of vehicle? – instead of having a cornucopia of AFVs like the Indons and certain others, why not have an all-LAV force? if ammo compatibility is a good thing, engine commonality is even better, and since many LAV-sized vehicles happen to run on civilian medium truck engines, commonality of engines and thus spare parts among one's entire fleet of vehicles is in fact feasible if intelligently and consistently pursued.

Why do Marines need to make opposed landings? Like MBLT said, "dont land at the pier." So how else are you going to get Marines into an island? Hit the beach. In hitting the beach, especially in one defended, maybe the captain of those ships that can offload directly onto a beach wont risk his ship or crew, unless the beach is secure and has been taken first. How do you take a beach and secure it? Land marines in there and secure it, then ships can offload men and supplies. How can you land marines in the beach? Many different ways, fast boats like CB-90s, yes, RHIBs, bancas, yes. But in an island larger than an average spratly island, like Jolo for example, you will need to go inland from the beach to secure and protect the beach landing site so ships can start offloading. So in the initial first stages, Marines will both need a landing vehicle and a means of going inland under armor protection...thus in WWII the LVTs were born. RHIBs, CB-90s, bancas, you leave on the beach unless for some reason Marines wants to carry them, as to LVT/AAVs are amphibious, these things travel on water, can land at the beach and move inland to secure the beach at the same time, since LVT/AAVs are both amphibious landing vehicles as well as APC. Then again there are other ways around this, if the enemy does not have true anti-air defenses for example, take an island by using AirCav would be ideal, or making a Fireforce reminiscent of Rhodesian times, alot of different scenarios,which in itself has its drawbacks and since im not a marine or in AirCav this is just my 2cents worth. A Marine is different from an Army trooper as he has capability to conduct amphibious warfare operations, a Marine that has vehicles that dont swim...

yes, yes, we already know everything else you said but this is the question at the root of it all: Why would our Marines need to make opposed landings? like mblt said, "outflank" - was the landing at Maimbung opposed? was that beach defended? else how can mblt say that the MNLF "did not expect" that landing if they were there on the beach to oppose it?

furthermore, if you perceive that it's risky to expose a slow-moving LSV to shore fire, what more an equally-slow moving AAV? wouldn't an enemy capable of damaging a large ship be equally a threat to a thin-skinned AAV?

and as I have said the LCs/RHIBs/bancas deliver the Marines on the beach to await/join-up with their FSVs and overland transport offloaded via LSV, and obviously these will take them the rest of the way. now, what of the need for specialized ships to deploy AAVs? how about an answer to that question?

Well since your questions are about what MBLT said and hes the one with knowledge and even first hand experience when it comes to Marine operations, why dont you ask him and wait for an answer?

:aberet: but you also invoked "like MBLT said"? how can it be overlooked (?) that if there is no applicable rationale for opposed landings and that there is an existing alternative to vehicles that can swim, there is no remaining argument for AAVs?...anyway, is it safe for us to assume that you no longer possess or are able to uphold any objection to what's been asserted against AAVs?

i'm surprised that the issue of piers is still being raised since the point is not about landing at "piers" per se, but of there being existing facilities of any type that would allow the PN's existing ships to safely land men and material, including of course beaches accessible to its LSVs.

Yes i invoked MBLT said on my post, as a quote. You still need to ask him what he meant by some of the things he said on this thread that you have questions about.

---Nope, i am advocating the PMC getting dedicated tracked LVT/Armored Amphibious Vehicle-type amphibious landing vehicles, its just that i think that the PMC needs to look at other alternatives than the AAVP7. And in any case, what the Marines wants they take time to study and rate its performance and to the PMC getting AAVP7s is not just a whim some general had one day, theyve been planning to get them since the 80s, and to now they still want to get them, that must tell you something about what they want. Is it also safe to assume you no longer believe the PMC should look at AMX-10RC?

ah, so you are still clinging to the idea of obtaining AAVS, your remaining argument being, because the Marines want them...the problem with that of course is that whatever the results of their purported studies are it has not been presented here as such, thus no one is obliged to wait for - much less default to - theirs or anybody else's opinion concerning what conclusions can be validly arrived at regarding the sum of what has at present been posted here.

which also answers your query about the possibility of my modifying my stance concerning AMX-10RCs, since I really don't see any surviving "arguments" (i.e. opposed landings, vehicles that can swim as opposed to ships that can beach) necessitating that I concede or alter anything I said concerning the rationale for FSVs like, say, the AMX-10RC or the LAV. of course tracked vehicles are not out of the question since I earlier advocated studying the feasibility of MBTs, and again rest assured that I remain advocating what I earlier advocated.

Interesting assertion. Care to cite your references? It'll make for interesting reading.

Sounds like a "chicken or the egg" discussion.

“references” are for technical matters, the ability to elucidate one’s ideas is the requirement for subjects less amenable to the Windows cut-and-paste function such as tactics and strategy. I’ve been an enthusiast of history since long before the internet became generally accessible, so if you’re really interested in deeper insights I recommend picking up a book: “blitzkrieg” per se, the heated debate ignited by the revisionist John Mosier covers a lot of ground; tactics in general, I have long admired the theories of the late Col. John Boyd, father of the F-16 and formulator of the famous Boyd Cycle.

your analogy is misapplied. “chicken or egg” is an example of an infinity-type paradox, regarding infantry and tanks on the battlefield there is no paradox whatsoever: since in the situation given they happen to be moving together or advancing at the same rate, and because tanks and human beings obviously have differing rates of motion, the situation begs the question: who is deferring to whose rate of movement, or who is slowing down for whom? – the answer of course is the tank since at top speed these undoubtedly roll on their tracks faster than infantry can run. since it is the tank commander who is deferring to the pace of the infantry advancing beside his vehicle, it is therefore obvious that it is the infantry that is dictating the rate of advance for both.

datu: never mind. I have the answer to my most important question

V-150 lands on beach from Philippine Navy LSV (Landing Support Vessel) (d@mmit never knew they had this book online)

that's one of the Navy's LSVs, that's one of the Marines' V-150s, and that's definitely a beach, not a pier.

new question, though...



http://members.tripod.com/pmcmssr/index.html

judging from the raised flotation screens, these LAVs look like they swam to shore - if so, deployed from which Philippine Navy vessel? :dunno: