| QUOTE (flipzi @ Apr 27 2006, 04:59 PM) |
| CAFGUs successfully repelled the rebels? Wow! That's a big improvement. The CAFGUs are usually armed with M1 Garand rifles, how come the rebels, who are usually armed with better weapons, failed to overpower the CAFGUs and decided to withdraw? Are the CAFGUs now armed with M16s and M14s? Or is it plain good tactics and bravery? |
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| A plaque of recognition was presented to Citizen Active Auxillary CAFGU member Clementino C. Moreno for gallantly supporting the San Agustin police force during the attack. |
| QUOTE (flipzi @ May 2 2006, 03:07 PM) |
| Or the rebels underestimated their skills. The CAFGU's defensive positions and preparedness might have prevented the rebels from using their numerical and firepower advantage. |
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| Misuse of CAFGU funds still unresolved Print E-mail Written by Gemma B. Bagayaua Sunday, 28 December 2008 In the past decade or so, government auditors have consistently found indications that funds meant for civilian forces helping in the military’s anti-insurgency campaign are being misused. Recent efforts by the armed forces leadership have not been enough to dismantle the practice, according to Army insiders interviewed by Newsbreak. The practice has become so deeply entrenched, they say, and the very nature of the Citizen’s Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) discourages accountability among members. Sought for comment, Lt. Col. Romeo Brawner, Army public information officer, gave assurances that “we have gone a long way in professionalizing the administration of the CAFGU,” and more reforms are being carried out. In 1999, while examining the books of the Army’s 4th Infantry Division (4th ID), auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) noticed that the signatures of some CAFGU members that were reflected in the division payroll were different from the signatures that appeared in their community tax certificates. The auditors included this observation in the commission’s Annual Audit Report and suggested that it created “doubts to the existence of some CAFGU personnel.” They also noted that, for that year, P3.27 million in advances on CAFGU funds were not liquidated on time, in violation of auditing rules. Double payments It was not to be the last time that COA auditors would report on possible misuse of the CAFGU funds. The latest annual audit report (for 2007) on the Army again mentioned possible irregularities. The report disclosed that CAFGU Active Auxiliary personnel (CAAs) in three divisions—5th ID, 7th ID and 9th ID—were paid some P1.95 million in subsistence allowance even after termination from service. It also found: * CAAs without appointment orders that were included in the payroll, * CAAs whose names appeared twice in the payroll but with different serial numbers, * CAA appointment orders with the same serial numbers but with different names per appointment order, * CAAs who have a different serial numbers per appointment order. The report noted that it is “highly improbable” that the Army’s G8 would issue different serial numbers for the same person, and that this practice resulted in “double payment” amounting to P165,240. It also noted some P2.42 million in “overpayments” to CAAs with different names but same serial numbers, and those with same names but different middle initials. “It is most likely that the persons are the very same person,” the report said. ‘Innocent’ start Brawner told Newsbreak that P1.95 million of the unliquidated cash advances were returned to the national treasury in the early part of 2008. The other irregularities, he said, are being addressed through the reforms being undertaken by the Army to professionalize CAFGU personnel and, consequently, the handling of CAFGU funds. However, some officers say the problem will take a while to solve, mainly because the practice is so deeply entrenched. In many cases, the practice started innocently enough. Many detachments are very difficult to reach, one Army colonel explains. More often than not, CAFGU members do not receive their allowance personally, and “finance sergeants often have to sign for the CAFGU personnel.” For a time, records at the general headquarters were not updated to remove the names of those who had either resigned or been relieved. Divisions then continued to get the subsistence allowance of these dismissed or retired CAFGU volunteers. Unit commanders, some consulting with their division commanders, would then use the excess funds as they saw fit. The practice was tolerated because waiting for the headquarters to process requests for new funds often took a long time. The excess CAFGU funds came in handy as the unit’s slush fund. No way to account The trouble was “there is no way to account for how they used it,” said the Army colonel who spoke on condition that he will not be named. Some commanders used it for incidental expenses. “You might need a new CAFGU detachment and have no funds for it. Or, one of the men may have gotten injured.” There are those, however, who used the funds for personal expenses. Those seeking to reform the CAFGU at that time traced the problem to the fact that there were no built-in checks and balances in the system. “The field battalions were the ones handling, paying, and administering their own units,” another Army colonel privy to the reform efforts said. Because of this, the system became prone to abuse. Units either exaggerated the number or did not report those dismissed or retired so they would get the corresponding sums for the CAFGU’s subsistence allowance. |