Title: LET US LEARN A LESSON OR TWO FROM THE FINNS
Description: The Winter War: 40,000 v. 1-2 Million
epigone - May 21, 2006 01:23 AM (GMT)
MSantor - May 21, 2006 01:28 AM (GMT)
They Finns may have beat the Soviets in 1940, but they still lost when the Soviets invaded again in 1944. And their leader Mannerheim had to cede a lot of territory after they lost all that territory from the city of Viipuri to the area just outside Leningrad. The Finns still lost, even when a Nazi German Panzer Division was sent to reinforce their Finnish Allies.
You want to learn a lesson of an underdog versus a goliath, learn from the history of the three British Biplane Gloster Gladiator biplanes who defended the island of Malta in 1940-1943, against waves of thousands of Nazi German and Fascist Italian planes.
Those three planes were named "Faith, Hope and Charity" and held the line against more modern planes like the German Messerschmitt.
epigone - May 21, 2006 01:40 AM (GMT)
Thank you. Now I know, Sir!
But forcing the Soviets into concessions was a feat worth emulating. Two million versus 30 thousand was great. I remember it vividly when I watched it. One Finnish soldier throwing a molotov cocktail inside the hatchet of a tank. High above in the forest mountain, Finnish soldiers suffering from frostbite and unable to move aiming at the left , right , front, back flanks. Soldiers with submachine guns skiing past Soviet forces and killing a lot unscathed. That was great. Magnifico!
possible - May 21, 2006 07:56 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 21 2006, 09:28 AM) |
They Finns may have beat the Soviets in 1940, but they still lost when the Soviets invaded again in 1944. And their leader Mannerheim had to cede a lot of territory after they lost all that territory from the city of Viipuri to the area just outside Leningrad. The Finns still lost, even when a Nazi German Panzer Division was sent to reinforce their Finnish Allies.
You want to learn a lesson of an underdog versus a goliath, learn from the history of the three British Biplane Gloster Gladiator biplanes who defended the island of Malta in 1940-1943, against waves of thousands of Nazi German and Fascist Italian planes.
Those three planes were named "Faith, Hope and Charity" and held the line against more modern planes like the German Messerschmitt. |
A few minor clarifications. That the legendary Faith, Hope, and Charity ever had to stand "against waves of thousands of Nazi German and Fascist Italian planes" is a myth resulting from an ignorance of the real history involved. In truth, the period in which the Sea Gladiators had to fly alone lasted a grand total of 17 days. Even then, the Italians' sole objective (the Germans were not yet involved) on launching the first air raid 12 June, 1940 was simply harassment, to prevent British forces on Malta from interfering with the larger Axis goal, the invasion of North Africa. Unlike Finland, Malta was never singled-out for invasion.
True, the Germans did intervene later on, but only after more advanced British air units arrived in theater. Including the famed Hawker Hurricane which formed the primary air defense of Malta from July, 1940 until the Supermarine Spitfire's arrival in 1941. Not counting the might of the Royal Navy, who lost at least one aircraft carrier to Axis airpower.
True, the Germans did commit much larger numbers of aircraft than did the Italians, but only around 400 in total, not the hyperbolic "waves of thousands". Then it was the Brits' turn to fail, since their objective for deploying powerful forces on strategically-located Malta was to stop a certain Erwin Rommel from reaching Africa. I'm sure we all know what happened next.
As for the Finnish "defeat" in 1944, it would be very informative to note that while the all-out offensive known as the Winter War ended in humiliation for Russia in March, 1940, the succeeding Continuation War - essentially, a war of attrition dragging-on 1941-1944 - gradually but inevitably exhausted the resources of the small Finnish nation, leading to an equally-inescapable capitulation.
The real lesson here is that smaller forces succeed in winning wars against larger opponents only if the latter foolishly plays to the strengths of its adversary. Victory goes to the commander who is better able to maximize all the resources under his discretion, including the bravery and skill of the individual soldier as well as the prudence and ingenuity of the men making the plans. It is an irresponsible leader who bets everything on one roll of the dice.
MSantor - May 21, 2006 11:14 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (possible @ May 21 2006, 03:56 PM) |
A few minor clarifications. That the legendary Faith, Hope, and Charity ever had to stand "against waves of thousands of Nazi German and Fascist Italian planes" is a myth resulting from an ignorance of the real history involved. In truth, the period in which the Sea Gladiators had to fly alone lasted a grand total of 17 days. Even then, the Italians' sole objective (the Germans were not yet involved) on launching the first air raid 12 June, 1940 was simply harassment, to prevent British forces on Malta from interfering with the larger Axis goal, the invasion of North Africa. Unlike Finland, Malta was never singled-out for invasion.
True, the Germans did intervene later on, but only after more advanced British air units arrived in theater. Including the famed Hawker Hurricane which formed the primary air defense of Malta from July, 1940 until the Supermarine Spitfire's arrival in 1941. Not counting the might of the Royal Navy, who lost at least one aircraft carrier to Axis airpower.
True, the Germans did commit much larger numbers of aircraft than did the Italians, but only around 400 in total, not the hyperbolic "waves of thousands". Then it was the Brits' turn to fail, since their objective for deploying powerful forces on strategically-located Malta was to stop a certain Erwin Rommel from reaching Africa. I'm sure we all know what happened next.
As for the Finnish "defeat" in 1944, it would be very informative to note that while the all-out offensive known as the Winter War ended in humiliation for Russia in March, 1940, the succeeding Continuation War - essentially, a war of attrition dragging-on 1941-1944 - gradually but inevitably exhausted the resources of the small Finnish nation, leading to an equally-inescapable capitulation.
The real lesson here is that smaller forces succeed in winning wars against larger opponents only if the latter foolishly plays to the strengths of its adversary. Victory goes to the commander who is better able to maximize all the resources under his discretion, including the bravery and skill of the individual soldier as well as the prudence and ingenuity of the men making the plans. It is an irresponsible leader who bets everything on one roll of the dice. |
Mr. Possible,
I agree that "Waves of Thousands" may have been a bit of an exaggeration, but in that relatively brief time until the Hurricanes and Spitfires arrived, those 3 Gladiators still performed quite a feat holding on against hundreds of Axis planes, regardless of whether they were committed together or piecemeal. It's as comparable to those 4 USMC Wildcats that held off the first invasion of Wake Island in Dec.1941 before it was overrun. It's also comparable to the Battle off Samar, in October 1944, where a small US force of thin-skinned escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts drove a larger Japanese Force of battleships and cruisers. Therefore, my point is, sure the defeat of the "Goliath" by a "David" may be the "Goliath's" fault, but it's the tenacity of the "David" that forces the "Goliath" to make mistakes or lose his nerve.
PS
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I remember reading somewhere that the first wave of 40+ Hurricanes delivered by the USS Wasp (CV-7) to reinforce the island in 1942 were mostly caught on the ground, leaving the 3 Gladiators to hold on longer until the Axis were driven out of North Africa. And of course, we've all heard of the Operation Pedestal Convoy, where the carrier HMS Eagle was sunk BY A U-BOAT escorting a badly needed suppy convoy on the way to Malta.
The only RN Carrier sunk by Axis airpower was the HMS Hermes sunk in the Indian Ocean in April 1942 by the same Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor.
possible - May 22, 2006 12:01 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 21 2006, 07:14 PM) |
Mr. Possible,
I agree that "Waves of Thousands" may have been a bit of an exaggeration, but in that relatively brief time until the Hurricanes and Spitfires arrived, those 3 Gladiators still performed quite a feat holding on against hundreds of Axis planes, regardless of whether they were committed together or piecemeal. It's as comparable to those 4 USMC Wildcats that held off the first invasion of Wake Island in Dec.1941 before it was overrun. It's also comparable to the Battle off Samar, in October 1944, where a small US force of thin-skinned escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts drove a larger Japanese Force of battleships and cruisers. Therefore, my point is, sure the defeat of the "Goliath" by a "David" may be the "Goliath's" fault, but it's the tenacity of the "David" that forces the "Goliath" to make mistakes or lose his nerve.
PS Correct me if I'm wrong, but I remember reading somewhere that the first wave of 40+ Hurricanes delivered by the USS Wasp (CV-7) to reinforce the island in 1942 were mostly caught on the ground, leaving the 3 Gladiators to hold on longer until the Axis were driven out of North Africa. And of course, we've all heard of the Operation Pedestal Convoy, where the carrier HMS Eagle was sunk BY A U-BOAT escorting a badly needed suppy convoy on the way to Malta.
The only RN Carrier sunk by Axis airpower was the HMS Hermes sunk in the Indian Ocean in April 1942 by the same Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor. |
I notice that you have fallen silent about the subject of this thread. To reiterate, my point is that the Winter War is the true example of a David triumphing over a Goliath, and not the myth of the British “defense” of Malta in June, 1940. Again, June, 1940 or the 17 days between the first Italian raid and the arrival of reinforcements shortly before the end of the month was the only time the three Sea Gladiators flew alone in defense of the island. In that time they suffered at least thirty raids by escorted Italian bombers, none of which numbered “hundreds” of aircraft. This lack of real aggressiveness by the Italians was frankly admitted by the British; the explanation, as stated earlier, was that it was never Mussolini’s intention to invade or capture the island. The raids were simply meant to suppress British efforts to interfere with the primary Italian objective of securing North Africa for the Axis.
Notice the conspicuous absence of Mussolini’s allies the Nazis in this stage of the conflict; the fact is, the Gladiators never had to face the likes of the Me109 or any other technologically-superior aircraft by themselves. The best fighter employed by the Italians was the CR.42 – ironically, another seemingly-anachronistic biplane similar to the Gladiator.
Thus, the myth of the heroic “defense” of Malta by a pitiful trio of obsolete biplanes. There was never a threat of invasion so there was never the prospect of being overwhelmed by wave upon wave of determined attackers. Never the reality of technologically-superior enemy fighters so never the possibility of being forced to confront a truly dominating foe.
When misconceptions are cast aside, we find ourselves looking away from ultimately-secondary questions of who won isolated duels in favor of looking at the big picture, that is, in terms of who achieved stated objectives and who did not. The Italian goal being to secure access to North Africa - which the British at Malta evidently failed to prevent – we can rightly say that the Italians accomplished what was necessary to their plans. The British, deprived of the initiative, could only hope to survive until the arrival of reinforcements; given that it was never a fervent hope of the Italians to displace the British from Malta, we can rightly judge this fait accompli overrated.
The Finns, on the other hand, were fighting a war of national survival against a numerically-massive enemy. Unlike Malta, their country was not an incidental target or one that happened to be on the periphery of the frontlines – rather, they were the frontline since Germany had yet to actualize their hostility to the Soviet Union. Unlike the “defense” of Malta, their victory was genuinely-important strategically because they had frustrated their opponent’s given rationale for initiating hostilities, which is conquest. That they did this against genuinely-intimidating odds cannot help but echo the biblical example of David versus Goliath hence the point and the lesson of this thread.
Your so-called “point” that it is the tenacity of David which makes Goliath lose his nerve does not apply to your example of Malta since the Italians evidently did not lose interest in expediting the Axis campaign in North Africa. You fail to make a distinction between actions with limited objectives as opposed to actions with genuine strategic import. The USN bombarded Iranian oil platforms in 1987 as a punitive measure, would the Iranians have been justified to claim defeating an attempt at invasion given the scope of the American’s actions? There had been highly-publicized PMC activity within Fort Bonifacio in the aftermath of the most recent February 25, would our political leadership been justified had they labeled the latter a frustrated coup and a pretext for martial law?
Wake Island is not comparable to Malta since the former as you said involved an actual invasion, in contrast to the merely-disruptive raids mounted against the Mediterranean isle. Same goes for the non-example of TG 77.4 since the jeep carriers directly-opposed Kurita’s mission of destroying the Leyte landing force, whereas Faith, Hope, and Charity did not impede Italian efforts in Africa. You are also wrong to mistake the 1942 delivery of Supermarine Spitfires onboard USS Wasp as the first attempt to reinforce Malta, as I said earlier what survived of the Gladiators (two had been shot down) received reinforcements 17 days after the first Italian raid, in the form of Hawker Hurricanes being evacuated to Egypt from France. More arrived in the period between July, 1940 and the Wasp’s arrival April, 1942. The error regarding HMS Eagle is admitted, though the fact remains: You have failed to grasp the real significance of the events on Malta June, 1940 hence have overstated its relevance vis-à-vis the subject of this thread, namely, the Winter War of 1939, Finland versus Soviet Russia, David versus Goliath, David triumphant.
MSantor - May 22, 2006 02:09 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (possible @ May 22 2006, 08:01 AM) |
Your so-called “point” that it is the tenacity of David which makes Goliath lose his nerve does not apply to your example of Malta since the Italians evidently did not lose interest in expediting the Axis campaign in North Africa. You fail to make a distinction between actions with limited objectives as opposed to actions with genuine strategic import. |
While my facts may not all be straight, since it's been a while since I read anything on the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in WW2, I don't think it matters whether any of the examples I stated other than the Winter War and Malta ones have any strategic or tactical importance, or whether they were successful or not. You can't deny the tenacity of the of units who exemplify the "Charge of the Light Brigade" spirit- whether they're futile or not, regardless of whether they actually contributed to the war or not. That was my emphasis, not whether it was some "isolated duels"; you just plainly dismissed most of my examples because you were so focused on whether they affected the big picture or not, or whether they were successful or not.
I will admit that I was mistaken using Malta as an example, but the Battle of Samar is certainly is an example to me; the USN victory in that small action did not radically alter the course of the war, but the prevention of a IJN victory in that instance- (the never-to-be bombardment of MacArthur's landing ships by Admiral Kurita)- is important because it ensured the continued momentum of Allied forces toward the Japanese Home Islands.
And to mollify you with a real example, the Battle of Midway certainly is an example where outnumbered forces achieved a strategic objective/decisive victory. And so was the Finnish master stroke in the Winter War by isolating and destroying that Soviet Division in the Battle of Suomussalmi in that part of the front.
Again, my emphasis is on "The Charge of the Light Brigade Spirit" against overwhelming odds, regardless of whether they had strategic import or not, which I inferred was the whole point of the "Winter War" thread in the first place.
Now that we're done digressing,
let's get back to topic. :btt:
possible - May 26, 2006 02:30 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 22 2006, 10:09 AM) |
| While my facts may not all be straight, since it's been a while since I read anything on the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in WW2, I don't think it matters whether any of the examples I stated other than the Winter War and Malta ones have any strategic or tactical importance, or whether they were successful or not. You can't deny the tenacity of the of units who exemplify the "Charge of the Light Brigade" spirit- whether they're futile or not, regardless of whether they actually contributed to the war or not. That was my emphasis, not whether it was some "isolated duels"; you just plainly dismissed most of my examples because you were so focused on whether they affected the big picture or not, or whether they were successful or not. |
Romantic as the Charge of the Light Brigade may appear to the undiscerning, it nevertheless remains one of the worst examples of military incompetence in history. Hundreds of lives needlessly lost because of a vaguely-worded order. If you want to discuss useful lessons learned from this episode of the Crimean War, talk about the breakdown in communications between the British units that resulted in Lord Raglan’s attacking the wrong target. If you want to talk about making movies, then by all means play-up the tenacity of the cavalrymen sent to their deaths by irresponsible commanders.
By “non-example”, I refer to your calling the action of Sprague against Kurita “comparable” to your example of Malta.
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 21 2006, 07:14 PM) |
| It's also comparable to the Battle off Samar, in October 1944, where a small US force of thin-skinned escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts drove a larger Japanese Force of battleships and cruisers. Therefore, my point is, sure the defeat of the "Goliath" by a "David" may be the "Goliath's" fault, but it's the tenacity of the "David" that forces the "Goliath" to make mistakes or lose his nerve. |
Again, the reason for the Brits’ holding-on to Malta was not a lack of nerve or mistakes on the part of the Italians. It was simply because the Italians never intended to invade or capture the island. Evicting the British was not necessary to their ultimate objective of expediting the campaign on the African mainland. They were content to pin down the British thus preventing them from sallying-forth and hindering the greater goal, which goal the Italians evidently attained.
Again, the same does not apply for TU 77.4.3 since as I said the jeep carriers directly-prevented Kurita’s potentially-devastating attack on the American landing force. Yet now you call Sprague’s ploy a “small action”.
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 22 2006, 10:09 AM) |
| I will admit that I was mistaken using Malta as an example, but the Battle of Samar is certainly is an example to me; the USN victory in that small action did not radically alter the course of the war, but the prevention of a IJN victory in that instance- (the never-to-be bombardment of MacArthur's landing ships by Admiral Kurita)- is important because it ensured the continued momentum of Allied forces toward the Japanese Home Islands. |
Had Kurita succeeded, he would have certainly altered the course of the war. I sincerely doubt the occupied Philippines could have been retaken by disembarked sailors.
Ironically, after citing the Light Brigade fiasco, you choose to invoke, of all things, its antithesis.
| QUOTE (MSantor) |
| And to mollify you with a real example, the Battle of Midway certainly is an example where outnumbered forces achieved a strategic objective/decisive victory. |
Midway was a perfect example of what happens when information gets to the people able to make the most of it. The Americans had discovered the enemy’s objective from deciphered Japanese communications and rushed their most powerful forces to the site of the planned invasion. The Japanese had fully-anticipated gaining surprise on the Americans, instead the tables were turned as their fleet was caught unprepared to deal with the American carrier force. Their aircraft had been launching raids against land targets - the Midway airstrips – when they received word of the US Navy’s arrival. The moment of indecision as the IJN commander hesitated between continuing with the mission of invasion and committing to an all-out attack on the American fleet proved fatal.
The example of Midway is comparable to that of Malta in the sense that, unlike the Japanese, the Italians did not allow themselves to be seduced away from their main goal. Precious resources would have had to have been committed to an invasion of Malta, soldiers, ships, and planes that would have been used in the African theater. Had the Japanese commander emulated the Italians in deciding on a single task and sticking to it, history might have been different. As fate would have it, clarity of objectives was an advantage exhibited by the Americans.
What isn’t clear, though, is why you’ve contradicted yourself.
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 22 2006, 10:09 AM) |
You can't deny the tenacity of the of units who exemplify the "Charge of the Light Brigade" spirit- whether they're futile or not, regardless of whether they actually contributed to the war or not. That was my emphasis, not whether it was some "isolated duels"; you just plainly dismissed most of my examples because you were so focused on whether they affected the big picture or not, or whether they were successful or not.
And so was the Finnish master stroke in the Winter War by isolating and destroying that Soviet Division in the Battle of Suomussalmi in that part of the front.
Again, my emphasis is on "The Charge of the Light Brigade Spirit" against overwhelming odds, regardless of whether they had strategic import or not, which I inferred was the whole point of the "Winter War" thread in the first place. |
You play-up “tenacity” regardless of the futility or eventual outcome of the action. This is contrary to your very first post in which you dismissed the Winter War as a non-example of an “underdog versus a goliath” situation simply because the Finns lost later on.
| QUOTE (MSantor @ May 21 2006, 09:28 AM) |
| They Finns may have beat the Soviets in 1940, but they still lost when the Soviets invaded again in 1944. And their leader Mannerheim had to cede a lot of territory after they lost all that territory from the city of Viipuri to the area just outside Leningrad. The Finns still lost, even when a Nazi German Panzer Division was sent to reinforce their Finnish Allies. |
Surely a few thousands against a few millions is an example of an underdog’s tenacity versus a goliath, regardless of whether the outnumbered thousands still lost in the next war. And if is indeed your intention to emphasize tenacity even in the face of futility, why have you chosen to specifically-emphasize a Finnish victory? Are you in fact attempting an about-face, or have you simply lost track of your claims?
Dispelling misconceptions is never a digression when those misconceptions detract from the topic. It is a duty to protect others from the tyranny of ignorance.
MSantor - May 26, 2006 04:54 AM (GMT)
| QUOTE (possible @ May 26 2006, 10:30 AM) |
You play-up “tenacity” regardless of the futility or eventual outcome of the action. This is contrary to your very first post in which you dismissed the Winter War as a non-example of an “underdog versus a goliath” situation simply because the Finns lost later on.
|
Will give it a rest now? I would have assumed my later comments would have nullified my first, earlier comment on the Finnish Winter War. Alright I was wrong about the first comment, but then I still stick to my emphasis on the "tenacity factor".
The Finns DO deserve recognition for their tenacious defense of their homeland of the Soviets in the first Soviet invasion.
I hope everything's clear now. No need to dub me as a tyrant of ignorance.
Since we've both digresseed, let's get :btt: , since Mr.Possible, you obviously know far more about these certain topics than an amateur WW2 historian such as I. I wouldn't be surprised if I was talking to an NDCP grad or a US Naval War College grad.
:bow:
BTW, does anyone know here how well those Finnish Brewster Buffalo fighters fared during the first Winter War?
possible - May 29, 2006 06:40 AM (GMT)
Again, dispelling other’s misconceptions is not a digression. Speaking of which:
Tenacity. Courage. Bravery. Pretty, pretty words that ultimately have nothing to do with attaining victory in war. Countless historical examples from Thermopylae to Bataan prove that the losing side can display just as much never-say-die spirit as any glorious victor. Perhaps this tendency to cheapen the reality of combat has its roots in a desire for vicarious self-gratification (?!), a craving cultivated in today’s entitled society particularly by professional athletics franchises like the Red Sox, who are renowned for their perseverance almost as much as they are derided for their futility (until recently). But then, we do not bury baseball players after every game.
Regardless, defeat just like victory never happens without a reason, which, unfortunately, often lies in some commander’s stupidity. But the duty to defend one’s country remains. Heroism, just like irresponsibility, is simply effort disproportionate to one’s duty.
The Finnish example deserves to be mined for objective lessons demonstrating how military goals can be achieved despite a comparative disadvantage in resources. It is an irresponsible commander indeed who, despite a wealth of such lessons, can only instruct his men to give beyond what the call of duty demands of them. A great imparter of sound teachings long ago recognized that men serving under a good commander win no medals since they do not need to make-up for his mistakes with their lives. This of course is an ideal but then, one does not teach failure.
Finally, you are mistaken, Ignorance is like Destiny: No man can lord over it as a tyrant, only be its slave.
Mr. MSantor, you are very well-informed and you contribute insightful posts. It only remains for you to take the final step of ridding your mind of non-objective romantic notions and thus rigidly adhere to true critical thinking. :salute: