:patrioticpinoy: The Allied General Staff decided that the Philippines should be by-passed during the Allied March to the Japanese Isles. MacArthur appealed this consensus to his president who gave in to his "spoiled" General's request to fulfill a promise. The resulting slaughter and destruction of Manila ranks as one of the most devastated cities during WW2. All these because of MacArthur's oversized ego? :headbang:

:patrioticpinoy:

USS New Jersey fires off a Salvo at Leyte Gulf

Disembarkation at Lingayen


Kamikaze Attack



Prisoners massacred at Fort Santiago



Airial View of the ruins of Manila

Massacre in Manila






work of a Jap Bayonet




La libération des Philippines

A friend a few years back narrated having met some Taiwanese (who apparently knew a bit of history) who were actually apologetic that it was the Philippines, not Taiwan (or Formosa), that got caught between the Japs and the US.

Yep, it was his Big Mac ego.
.

"...The Singapore and the Philippines units had made the difficult initial entries, but their work was interrupted when the British had to move to Colombo and Fabian was evacuated by submarine from Corregidor in February, 1942, several weeks before MacArthur. Aside from such generalized observations, it is almost important to say which group, much less which individual, deserves the major share of credit for solving the edition of the fleet cryptographic system then in force..."-David Khan, The Scrutable Orientals, CODE BREAKERS.

I recommend the book for students of Mathematics, Foreign Languages, and Music. (Seriously. Music composers are known to have innate abilities to crack codes. The best American cryptographer was an orchestra player).

The best part of the book consists of its innumerable stories about codes and ciphers such as:

* How Navy cryptanalysts, in the basement of a building in Hawaii, fashioned the mid-air assassination of Japan's number-one warrior, Admiral Yamamoto.

*How John F. Kennedy escaped capture in the Pacific because the Japanese failed to solve even a simple cipher....

In March 1944 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Allied forces in the Pacific to begin an offensive toward the Philippine Islands. Recapture of the Philippines would be a profoundly important step toward the defeat of Japan, for from those islands the Allies could cut Japanese lines of communication to the rich, conquered territory of the Netherlands East Indies, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. In the Philippines the Allies could also establish bases from which to support subsequent advances against Formosa, the China coast, or Japan itself.

The War in the Pacific. The Approach to the Philippines by Robert Ross Smith.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-...Approach-1.html

The Joint Chiefs' Strategic Plans
"General MacArthur's concept of the best course of action in the Pacific did not coincide with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had decided that an advance via the Central Pacific would be strategically more decisive. The Joint Chiefs concluded that pressure applied on the Central Pacific front would bear directly on Japan's most vulnerable flank--the east--and would, indeed, outflank the enemy's positions in New Guinea. But operations along the New Guinea coast could not threaten Japan's bases in the Central Pacific and would not impair free movement by the Japanese Navy.

"The Joint Chiefs believed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet (commanded by Admiral Nimitz in addition to his area command) could be used to best advantage in the vast open reaches of the Central Pacific. Should naval operations in the Pacific precipitate an overwhelming defeat of the Japanese Navy, the Allies might be provided with an opportunity to bypass intermediate objectives and to strike directly against the Japanese home islands. Moreover, a drive through the Central Pacific would take advantage of rapidly growing American naval power, with which it might be found easier to move into the Philippines from the Central rather than the Southwest Pacific. "

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-...Approach-1.html

One of MacArthur's critical victories during the latter half of the war was over Admirals Ernest J. King and Chester D. Nimitz. They sought to bypass the Philipinnes in favour of an attack on the Japanese garrison at Formosa. MacArthur fought this tooth and nail, and the logistical arguments were on his side. He finally won over Roosevelt and on 20 October 1944, he waded ashore on Leyte Beach providing one of the most memorable images of the Pacific campaign. He remained in the Philippines for the remainder of the war, taking Manila on 3 March 1945, and was preparing his forces for an assault on the Japanese home islands when the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs made this irrelevant.

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=224

"1943 - 1944: argues with the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding reconquest of the Philippine Islands. Chiefs propose bypass; MacArthur appeals to President Roosevelt"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_McArthur

The series of military and naval operations leading to the liberation of the Philippine islands do have significant value:

1) It sovled the problem of how the still powerful Japanese Imperial Navy can be lured out to to risk itself in a final all out battle.

2) The Leyte landings induced the Japanese to sacrifice what was left of their navy into its eventual destruction at the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

3) There was a strong rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy. The fact that the the IJN disobeyed Yamashita's orders to evacuate Manila attests to this. Also, the Japanese Navy sailors and special landing troops which occupied Manila lost a lot of face from the catastrophic defeat of the IJN in Leyte Gulf without inflicting significant damage on American forces. The fanatical defense of Manila and the rapacious murder of Manilenos was the only way they could exact revenge.

3) We must also remember that the "atomic bomb" was not yet a factor in determining the strategy for the Pacific war. The only thing the Allied high command knew and understood was that they will eventually have to invade Japan itself.

4) Minus the knowledge of the atomic bomb as a sure fire weapon which would make the Japanese surrender, no Filipino would have ever forgiven the Americans if they bypassed the Philippines, (including and especially the capital, Manila).

5) Luzon was the only suitable and sizeable area near enough Japan which could have been a springboard for the the "eventual" conquest of the Japanese home islands. A large Filipino contingent would have also been necessary to supplement the American and British commonwealth troops earmarked for such a gigantic operation estimated to probably cost around one million allied casualties had it followed through.

Still, we are talking here of how the beautiful and historic city of Manila could yet be saved?

The options:

a) Offer food and medicine to the Japanese in exchange for releasing their Filipino and other hostages, or maybe even a free pass to join Yamashita's forces in the north if they felt like it.

b) Bombard Malate and Intramuros with sleeping gas and then launch assault troops.

c) The Philippine Liberation government insist that the liberation of Manila be done exclusively by Filipino troops and irregular units in much the same way as Free French forces liberated Paris.

d) Simply use chemical and biological weapons regardless of civilian casualties which would have been much the same when the Americans decided to use heavy artillery.

The Allied General staff's original plan was to take formosa and use this as a springboard for the main attack on Japan. The central pacific route was favored because it too would likely draw the IJN to a conclusive battle, while minimizing casualties resulting from fanatical land battles. Manila could have been spared its fate had this strategy been implemented. The ultimate victory of the americans would have meant freedom from the jap tyranny that would have undoubtedly made filipinos thankful to the americans.

MacArthur also, got licked by the japanese in the philippines during the opening months of the war. He likely had an itch to scratch here. just a thought. :armysmile:

"MacArthur argued persuasively that the Philippines could be successfully defended against a Japanese attack, but in the event he was caught hopelessly unprepared with his air support destroyed on the ground. Although some Filipino units fought splendidly, the balance were untrained and poorly equipped. They proved no match for the Japanese veterans. Two days after the main Japanese landings on Luzon, MacArthur ordered a general retreat to Bataan. However, because of MacArthur's insistence upon a forward defence, nothing had been done to prepare for this move."

"MacArthur's performance in the Philippines in 1941 was far from universally admired. His lack of visits to the front line earned him the nickname 'Dugout Doug'. However, he was winning the battle in the media. Just before the fall of Bataan he was evacuated, along with his family, to Australia and awarded the Medal of Honor for his conduct of the defence. It was at this point that he made the famous statement 'I came through and I shall return'."

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=224

just like a boxer defeated and longing for a chance to redeem lost prestige.

In hindsight it did have value pero its purely circumstantial

Naging viable lang ang final battle dahil malaki ang fuel shortage sa Japan sa buwan na umatake ang amerikano sa Leyte. Ang kanilang cruiser force ay naka station sa Brunei at Miri para malapit sa fuel source for the time being. Hindi ito na forsee ng Allies dahil sa buong akala nila itong souther naval force ay nagsasagawa pa rin ng java sea patrol.

Quite to the contrary it was not an inducement, but the only means to strike the allies nearest to the fuel stock. Hindi sila magkakaroon ng panibagong pagkakataon na mag naval sortie ng ganito kalaki pag gumalaw northward ang forces ni halsey.

Wala akong nakikitang value sa pangyayaring ito. Kung sa katunayan, ito ang pinag lalaban ni NIMITZ, kung nakuha nila ng northern formosa, practically forced to retreat ang japanese forces to mainland China or vietnam. Katulad ito ng epekto ng fall of rabaul. Hindi nila ito kinuha ng malaking force, ito ay ni render nilang immaterial once na lipun ng mga allies ang 1,000 mile radius ng rabaul (effective range ng betty bomber from rabaul)

Kung mag emphatize ka sa moment ng battle of Leyte Gulf, kung ako ang imperial battle staff magtataka rin ako bakit nagkaroon pa ng ganitong sideshow sa leyte. When rabual fell, western pacific was rich pickings.

The Java and Indian Ocean naval patrol was relegated to south china sea and philippine sea patrol duty para maprotektahan ang fuel bucket brigade from Miri to Mainland Japan. Without the "bomb" the japanese fuel bucket run is in peril once formosa is captured, kahit makarating pa ng shanghai ang japanese tankers at makapgtransfer ng fuel by rail to the trans manchurian railway. Easy reach na sila from bombers from guam transiting and refuelling via formosa.

Halsey in a way did induce the final breakout of the IJN dahil he moved north because alam nila ang strategic impact ng formosa sa supply and comm lines ng imperial forces. Ng si Halsey ay nasa coast of aurora pa lamang, walang formosa based air units ang na commit ang IJN at IA. Sa katunayan documented na during this moment may nag sortie na imperial army air unit as far as Bacolod to handle halsey. Bacolod is farther than formosa yet, hindi nila na commit ang formosa forces dahil kinoconsider nila itong strategic reserve. Philippines can fall but not formosa.

Buti na lang at ang Imperial staff blinked first and took halsey's bait to commit the formosa reserves to the battle of leyte gulf when his forward units was about to enter the luzon strait (or so they thought). Else it would not have been the biggest naval engagement (both air and surface) on record. Talagang laging talo ang mga praning.

Eh yung maraming namatay sa retake ng Philippines napatawad sila ng mga pinoy eh yung mas kaunti pa kaya namatay. Alam mo naman tayo we have short memories and short lived emotions. I would not be surprise kung pinatawad na natin sila after one week.

Kunyari nag agree ako sa argument na ito, outflanked pa rin ang imperial forces once formosa was taken. Hindi kailangan mag mount ng massive seaborne and sucessive inter island operations para makuha ang pilipinas muli. Sa katunayan, ang Pilipinas ay ginagawa ng mga imperial forces na transit point ng mga remnants ng central pacific imperials forces for movement to shanghai to shore up homeland divisions. Kung nakuha ang formosa, baka na accelerate pa ang processong ito. Ang kanilang withdrawal ay southward patungong borneo and singapore or maybe vichy french INDOCHINA.

Alam naman natin that in an enterprise as difficult as war, it's very hard to second guess. War events have a tendency to have a mind of its own which lead to undesirable consequences that cannot all be factored in.

For whatever reason, even FDR, Nimitz, and Halsey agreed with MacArthur in the end. ALL of them share the responsibility.

Formosa would be a nice "springboard" also BUT, we must remember that the Americans cannot rely on recruiting thoroughly Japanized Taiwanese to fight on the Allied side for the projected invasion of Japan proper. Plus, we must consider that it will have to be garrisoned with allied occupation troops if the locals were to prove hostile.

China and Manchuria (inculuding Korea) held about two mllion Japanese troops, the Allies were not even sure Stalin would join in the fight against the Japanese. The only allied troops avalibale were mostly unreliable Chinese Kuomintang forces under Chiang Kai Shiek who was almost impossible to get any real cooperation from, the rest were communists. A similar situation existed in French Indochina.

The Filipinos were the only reliable asians who had any real fighting value for the allied side. They were going to be very useful in the invasion of Japan. But before that can happen, the Philippines had to be liberated.

We should also remember that many more Filipinos might have died of starvation or simply murdered by Japanese occupation troops. Everyday that the Japanese held the Philippines meant that the Japanese would be less likely to surrender. Though it lacked material resources, the Japanese held a very high value to holding the Philippines, even more than Singapore.

The only real resentment about the Liberation of the Philippines is the conduct of the battle for Manila. The rest of the country, I'm sure, didn't mind being liberated by the Americans at all.

Battle of Manila[IMG]

Battle of Manila

:salute:

The Wounded

I really disagree with that thesis na US will recruit local forces to subdue Japan, why?

1. It takes 14-18 months to organize effective fighting formations kahit attached regiments lang to US divisions.

2. Remember, halos tapos na ang giyera sa Europe, the US economy is about to overheat in war production as 1/2 ng production output para sa european front is not needed anymore. War materiel expended after the battle of the bulge (dec 44) is 1943 production. The war must come to a conclusive end else the US economy will crash katulad noong 1929.

3. Before the battle of leyte gulf, it is already a known fact that atomic weapons is already viable, the trinity tests in alamogordo in July 45 only tested the feasibility of remote delivery by air of atomic weapons (i.e. microsecond simultaneous hexa-panel detonation system, barometric trigger for airburst etc). It gave nuclear weapons its standoff capability. Provided hindi naging succesful ang trinity tests, the option was to take small japanese real estate and detonate the bomb like a super claymore mine just like what the british did in the somme in WWI using tunnel mines. Mayroon pa ngang proposal na i demonstrate ang bomb offshore to subdue the will of the Japanese people to fight and whereby finding more time to develop atomic delivery systems.

4. I subscribe to the idea that the forces you need multiply by an exponential factor everytime you double the land area you occupy. Occupying the Philippines extended the war as time is required to transfer more than double the forces needed to occupy Japan as the occupied land mass significantly increased.


As for the two million Korean Manchurian imperial forces, bakit hindi nila naitawid in time bet oct 44 and july 45 (halos isang taon). Simple lang, fuel stocks available to japan is barely enough to refine aviation gas and bring more fuel from south east asia. The imperial command made the hard decision of using the fuel to bring in more fuel. That army was starving, kaya uncle joe stalin who originally reneged on his promise to attack the kwantung army and attachments change his mind when he found out this army was already starving.

Ang gusto ko lang itanong? kung may global war who determines who will live or die? Ano ang guideline kung pinoy, intsik,melayu, indiano o hapon ba ang dapat mamatay?

The battle of manila was very unfortunate, sa aking opinyon, isang malaking katangahan kung bakit kailangan pa lusubin ang maynila kung halos lahat ng pilipinas ay nakuha na in a span of 60 days. The japanese marines holed up in Manila that disobeyed Yamashita's orders was due for police action (the estimate was it was less than 2000 marines) not full scale military operation. They could have been allowed to transit to Shanghai in return for Manila or whatever deal but McArthur wants to have a show. Thus he got his show. A spectacular one.

A press release. For the sake of the credibility of command, the Joint Chiefs had to present a unified front. Halsey and Nimitz spared no effort in disagreeng w/ Mac, but had to relent in the end.

Very few japs, in manila, remained to be of any strategic significance. I was told by some senior citizens who witnessed these events at the time that americans enjoyed using "overwhelming Force". If they found a single jap sniper or 2 in a nice big Government building, they would open up with artillery and pound the structure to powder. Its like applying a sledgehammer to kill a guinea pig. :armyeek:

the US could have used guerilla Filipino forces as a tip of the spear. With US support, these could have swept the Japanese aside with less US casualty and structural damage. Manila's devastation mirrors a battle fought savagely between two armies numbering around 300,000 each, which was not the case. It was a mopping up operation executed with US Vegeance. :armycry:

We have to get our facts straight. If we are to assume that MacArthur had so much sway over the strategy and resources available for the allied effort in the Pacific simply because everybody fell for his enormous charm and ego then that is exactly what it is...mere assumption.

What are the facts?:

1) MacArthur was a republican and bascially an Army commander.

2) FDR was a democrat, he knew that MacArthur was not particularly a political asset to his administration.

3) The alternative strategy was mainly proposed by the Navy who had no great love for MacArthur at all.

So what you are telling me is that FDR and the Navy basically gave MacArthur a blank check to use up precious men and resources over their better judgement and professional military and political expertise just so that MacArthur can redeem his self-esteem or fulfill his personal promise?

We are talking here about a stratregic conference held in early 1944. When was the atomic bomb even proven to be a viable weapon?....a year later?

So who had a crystal ball that foretold the future of when the bomb would be ready? The allies certainly didn't know when the war would end. If it takes a year to raise ten Filipino divisions under American command even beyond the date of scheduled Philippine independence, then so be it.

Come to think of it. The MAIN reason why the Philippines did not recieve aid from the Marshall Plan was because it was not deemed as an ally but rather a U.S. "possession". If the war went on beyond July 4, 1946 and Filipino troops were still fighting in the Japanese home islands then we would have been officially an "ally" with every right to recieve such economic aid.

Remember that even when the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had exposed to the world the power of atomic weapons, the Japanese militarists were still dead set for continuing the war. Even when the Emperor recorded his peace message to the Japanese people, a group of young military officers raided the radio station trying to look for and destroy the Emperor's recording.

In other words, O.K. lang sa mga hapon kung mamatay silang lahat. Ganun kagago ang mga ulol na mga iyon noon.

The Allies demanded UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. In the end, the Japanese surrendered ONLY when they realized that the allies would spare the Japanese Emperor. So in fact, the Japanese were able to sue for an ARMISTICE. The Japanese condition for an end to hostilities were met. That's what the history books will never tell you. That's why a WAR CRIMINAL was basically allowed to stay unpunished and remain his country's head of state. That's also why the Japanese government and people of today have no qualms about honoring the souls of Tojo and other WAR CRIMINALS at the Yakusuni shrine.

The Marshall Plan was conceived to stem the rise of communism in Europe. The US recognized that Western Europe, with its devastated economy, was a breeding ground for communism. The cold war was following at the heels of WW2 (I think, even before it was over). Europe was seen as the frontline for this coming war, therefore, the Philippines was not identified as a priority. It was not a question of being an ally or a possession.

Exactly, That is my point. Although the Navy did it under duress from FDR’s own political weight. Even before WW2 started, Mac was already an American hero. The family background did help, in no small part, to add to his fame. Very Few generals could fill the shoes of a theater commander and still command universal respect. Up until then, Mac was in a roll of success and the public loved him for it. I would not be surprised if MacArthur threatened resignation if he did not get his way. It would be a blunder if FDR lost one of his most celebrated generals now. The MAC strategy was sound but the alternative central pacific route plan was deemed far more logical as it threatened Japan’s eastern flank, her most vulnerable. Formosa, because of its proximity to Japan and Ryukus, would have precipitated a final IJN and US navy battle, or at the very least, rendered the IJN ineffective if they chose not to give battle. It would have cut IJN supply lines to the Philippines and other very important objectives that otherwise would have threatened the American rear.

Evidence of this ego is abound. Consider these facts:

1. When he was near manila, he declared that he would be in the city to celebrate his 65th birthday at the end of January. When his men fell behind schedule, he berated them.
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/GENOCIDE/reviewsw26.htm

2. While holed up in corregidor, he reportedly asked Quezon for his fee for services rendered to the commonwealth. Quezon gave in to his request for a jewel encrusted gold scepter worth $500,000. Later, when Quezon was in the US, he would offer the same to Eisenhower, but Ike refused it because he deemed it inappropriate. :wow:


http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/GENOCIDE/reviewsw26.htm
Michael Schaller, author of “General Douglas MacArthur and the Politics of the Pacific War” (pp. 17-40, 39 footnotes, four images), holds a doctoral degree from the University of Michigan, is professor of history at the University of Arizona, and specializes in the study of American-East Asian relations. Schaller presents a refreshing evaluation of General of the Army MacArthur by assessing the political strength that the general had in the United States. Schaller attributes MacArthur’s wartime appointments, and awards and decorations—including the Medal of Honor—to the general’s “public relations abilities” rather than to his military aptitude. Schaller argues that MacArthur gained Roosevelt’s support for the allied return to the Philippines in 1944 because of MacArthur’s cunning political maneuvering and that likelihood that the forthcoming presidential election would pit Republican candidate MacArthur versus Democratic incumbent Roosevelt. The implication is that FDR “bought off” or sidetracked MacArthur’s political ambitions or that the general played a magnificent hand of poker and brought more glory to his military exploits and legend. Schaller questions MacArthur’s judgment and overconfidence, if not his sanity. In particular, the general, following his retirement from the U.S. Army, assumed the role of military advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, but was recalled to active duty in the U.S. Army and accepting an illegal gift of $500,000 in gold from President Quezon. MacArthur’s abilities and motives are questioned in the loss of the Army Air Force planes at Clark Field and the rout of the Philippine troops by the Japanese.


His (and Quezon’s) eccentricities are further proven further by this event.

In Washington on Feb 8, 1942, the War Deartment received a startling message proposing that the US immediately grant the Philippines their independence, that the islands be neutralized, that American and Japanese forces be withdrawn and the Philippine army be disbanded. :headbang: At the same time, General MacArthur sent a message to the Chief-of-Staff, General Marshal, explaining that the Philippine Garrison had sustained a casualty rate of 50%. “There is no denying the fact that we are near done”, he added.
FDR repudiated the neutrality scheme, insisting that the fight must continue. He authorized MacArthur to surrender Filipino troops if necessary, but forbade the surrender of American troops “so long as there remains the possibility of resistance”. –John Vader - History of the Second World War (Purnell)

Furthermore, one of the reasons President Truman fired general MacArthur was when the General argued for dropping some atomic bombs on the chinese armies in order for him to stabilize his front. (good thing Truman disagreed with Dugout Doug on this)