SunStar

Anak Bayan slams arrival of more soldiers to NegOr
By Jimmy Abayon and Maricar Aranas

THE militant youth group Anak Bayan slammed the fresh deployment of more troops to Negros Oriental, warning it will lead to more human rights abuses in the province.

Ronald Ian Evidente, Negros island Anak Bayan general secretary, issued the warning as scores of soldiers arrived in Negros Oriental Thursday aboard a C-130 military plane.

The group represents the initial batch of seven companies of Scout Rangers to be deployed here before the end of the month to intensify the military campaign against the New People's Army (NPA).

"Their arrival is the government's response to the mounting struggle of the farmers for land and basic social services...it will not resolve the land problem, poverty and lack of social services," Evidente told Sun.Star Dumaguete.

Evidente is on temporary release after his arrest last May for the alleged murder of a member of the Revolutionary Proletariat Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) in Sta. Catalina last December.

Brig. Gen. Geoffrey Sodusta, commanding general of the Philippine Army's 303rd Brigade based on the island, disclosed the deployment of more troops to Negros Oriental during the visit to Dumaguete City of President Arroyo to officiate on four groundbreaking ceremonies.

Brig. Gen. Sodusta said the troops would be composed of seven companies of scout rangers culled from different units of the 1st Scout Rangers Regiment all over the country.

He said the soldiers are scheduled to arrive in Negros Oriental this month and will augment the force tracking down the armed leftist rebels crisscrossing the countryside.

The massing of troops comes less than two months after the military overran a New People's Army training camp in a forested area of Barangay Tacpao in Guihulngan in June.

The clash left one government soldier and one rebel dead.

Farmers opposed to the subsequent deployment of government forces in at least three barangays in Guihulngan said sixteen soldiers were killed on government side.

Sodusta brushed aside the allegation saying militant groups distorted the story.

;) I WONDER IF ANAK BAYAN WILL TALK THE SAME LINE IF A COMPANY OF NPA'S ARRIVE IN THE ISLAND

7 SR companies for Negros? the neps must be wetting their pants by now :bounce:

:snipemo: Hell Yeah! :dancedevil:

Its more likely that "Anak Bayan" will welcome the NPA company with open arms, perhaps even join them. So you can see why their panties are in bunch with more troops in there.

Shoot. 7 SR companies mean serious business. Run run run away neps... :rifle:

Yes, a big military offensive in Negros island. Time to flee to other islands for the NeP regulars.

It is common knowledge that NPA dictums explicitly says " avoid engagements with SAF, SR and SF" now if SRs are in Negros, it will seriously affect their activities. Who can they count on to counter this threat, "the front organizations". Real fighting soldiers can dispel their serious "kotong" racket.

:fire: >>>>> :banana:

The AFP realized that Negros remains as one of the strategic and important tactical bases of the rebels, just like Mindoro. One proof of that is the discovery of a big rebel camp.

The 7 SRCs will comprise the new SR Batallion that will be headed by Col. Noel Buan, a tough Airborne Ranger himself.


"... Gov. George Arnaiz viewed the arrival of the Scout Ranger battalion in a different way. Arnaiz said it will boost the tourism industry in Negros Oriental as well as the economic situation. "

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FilipinoAegis/message/846

".. The arrival of a battalion-sized Army unit brought to three the number of major infantry units of the Armed Forces stationed on Negros island, excluding the 542nd Engineering Construction Battalion, which is mainly tasked to help local government units in countryside development. ..."

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FilipinoAegis/message/845

The anakbayan leftists have nothing to worry, for now, the 500-man SR battalion in Negros will undergo retraining, reorganization and consolidation for three months before being unleashed, the NeP elders of Anakbayan will then have 3 months to hide, train themselves or generally tremble in fear. :D

Scout Ranger battalions are also being formed in Luzon and Mindanao, is this a shift now for the SR from company operations to battalion level operations?

The life and exploits of LTC Buan, battalion commander of SRs in Negros, will be featured tonight - Pipol, Channel 2 afyer Insider news.

Jus a heads-up :specool:

Dang, i missed that... :drunk: Tequila really knocks me out.

Try milk RT :bounce:

The New Peoples Army (NPA) armed insurrection followed the traditional pattern of guerrilla warfare. NPA units were formed at the regional and front levels and were normally company-sized or smaller. Main regional guerrilla units usually had 80 to 150 fighters, whereas secondary units had 30 to 60 fighters. NPA operations were, by design, extremely decentralized, with local commanders having wide latitude to conduct attacks as they chose. Typically, NPA elements avoided contact with AFP troops by remaining in remote, mountainous areas until ready to stage an attack. For an assault, they concentrated their forces, forming companies and sometimes battalions to overwhelm government troopers. Afterward, they dispersed to avoid AFP retaliation.


Isolated government outposts of the constabulary, police, and militia were favorite targets. The NPA also attacked public buildings such as town halls as a demonstration of its power. The property of uncooperative landowners and businessmen was another common target. The communists normally attacked private property to punish owners for alleged abuses or to coerce the payment of "revolutionary taxes." Attacks on the country's infrastructure were rare; the NPA's demolition of several bridges on Luzon's Bicol Peninsula in 1987 created a popular backlash that apparently caused the NPA to abandon the tactic.


The communists' traditionally rural struggle came to the cities in the mid-1980s with the dramatic increase in NPA assassinations. Beginning in 1984, Davao City became the laboratory for the NPA's developing urban warfare strategy. There, armed city partisan units, known popularly as "sparrow teams," murdered local officials, constables, police, and military personnel in a sustained terror campaign. The NPA selectively targeted unpopular officials, claiming that the killings provided revolutionary justice. The NPA's Davao City offensive ended in 1986, but not before Romulo Kintanar, the mastermind of the Davao City offensive and future NPA chief, had initiated a similar operation in Manila. The tempo of sparrow assassinations in the capital increased slowly after 1984, then rose dramatically in 1987. Some 120 officials, including Aquino's secretary of local government, were assassinated by the NPA that year. As sparrow activity escalated, NPA targeting became more indiscriminate.


The guerrillas also targeted Americans in 1987 for the first time since the early 1970s. After threatening to strike official Americans for their support of the Philippine counterinsurgency effort, the NPA killed two United States airmen, an American retiree, and a Filipino outside Clark Air Base in October. In April 1989, NPA assassins struck United States Army Colonel James N. Rowe, a senior officer at the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, on his way to work in Manila. Several other attacks on United States servicemen and contractors followed in 1989 and 1990.


The NPA obtained most weapons from the Philippine military in raids and ambushes. Some guns and ammunition also were purchased locally. As a result, the guerrillas were armed much like the AFP, with an assortment of American-designed small arms, such as the M-16 rifle. NPA commanders complained, however, that weapons shortages hampered their operations. The Philippine military estimated that only one-half to two-thirds of NPA fighters had high-powered rifles. There were no indications in 1990 of foreign-supplied weapons.


Overall, life in the NPA was austere and demanding. Living conditions were harsh, the food generally poor, medical care primitive, and danger constant. The NPA relied on the party's extensive network of peasant supporters in remote villages. The masa (masses) provided food and lodging to mobile guerrilla bands and warned of approaching government troops. The CPP's base also facilitated communication among party and NPA elements through courier, telephone, and telegraph networks. By the late 1980s, NPA communications had become more sophisticated; long-range radios were used more frequently. Although women were given equal status as NPA fighters, they were normally given secondary support roles in guerrilla units. Discipline in the NPA was strict, designed to win the support of the people by ensuring that the NPA was not discredited by its members' misbehavior. Punishment under the CPP's system of revolutionary justice ranged from reprimand to expulsion and execution.

Carnelian International

The armed forces' primary mission in the late 1980s was combating the communist insurgency. During Marcos's last years, the communist movement expanded rapidly in political influence and military strength. By 1986, when Aquino came to power, the armed forces estimated that there were some 22,500 regular NPA guerrillas active in sixty-three of the country's seventy-three provinces. Reported insurgent strength peaked the following year at about 26,000 people. The Muslim insurgency, meanwhile, was relatively quiet. Although the military maintained forces in Moro areas, clashes with government forces were infrequent and the threat of a full-scale resurgence was low (see The Communist Insurgency; The Moros ).


Despite many well-publicized programs, the counterinsurgency effort in the early and mid-1980s was clearly failing to stem the rising tide of communist influence. Government estimates of NPA strength more than tripled between 1983 and 1986, from around 6,000 to more than 20,000. Recognizing the growing problem, Marcos escalated the counterinsurgency effort, emphasizing civic action. Under the aegis of the Home Defence Program, military units constructed roads and schools, provided disaster relief, assisted in maintaining security and public utilities, and performed law enforcement. Army engineer units, greatly expanded with United States assistance, played a key role in these development efforts. The armed forces also took part in literacy projects and the National Livelihood Program, which were designed to improve the standard of living in rural areas.


These programs notwithstanding, the government lost ground in its efforts to win hearts and minds. Part of the reason was the declining popularity of the Marcos government and increasing criticism of the armed forces. Many Filipinos felt that those in the military, particularly in the Philippine Constabulary and the militia, the Civilian Home Defence Force, had become increasingly abusive and corrupt. Human rights groups documented numerous petty crimes as well as more serious instances of unlawful arrest, torture, and "salvaging," the assassination of suspects and detainees. Most victims were suspected insurgents or their supporters. Public respect for the military eroded while relations between the armed forces and important groups, such as the Roman Catholic Church, deteriorated. Attempts to improve discipline within the armed forces through retraining, punishment, and dismissal appeared to do little to quell growing public fear and suspicion.


Initially, the Aquino government reversed the decline in human rights performance and made notable strides in restoring the tarnished image of the military. The 1987 constitution outlawed torture and all forms of "secret and incommunicado detention." It also established a permanent Commission on Human Rights and directed that the militia, constabulary, and police forces--frequent targets of abuse complaints--be disbanded. The armed forces were far less abusive in 1986 according to human rights groups. However, military discipline apparently worsened over the next two years. In 1987 military personnel were primary suspects in the assassination of a prominent leftist political activist and in two other incidents that resulted in the deaths of twelve Manila demonstrators and seventeen rural villagers. International human rights monitors alleged that abuses in 1988 were as bad as they were under Marcos. In an apparent reaction to mounting criticism, the military renewed efforts to improve civil-military relations, and reported abuse by the military declined over the next two years.
Human rights remained a concern in 1991. According to the United States Department of State's 1990 annual human rights report to Congress, abuses--including extra judicial killings-- continued. The report also criticized the government's failure to prosecute those responsible for the crimes. Lapses in the administration of justice were attributed in part to the strong imperative of the military to protect its own members, who were tried in military courts. Convictions on human rights violations were rare. Still, by 1990 the overall armed forces human rights record under Aquino was much improved over the Marcos era.


Although the Aquino government scored other successes in its counterinsurgency campaign, initial efforts proved disappointing. The new administration hoped that many NPA personnel could be coaxed out of the hills following the overthrow of Marcos and took up the theme of reconciliation in 1986. One of Aquino's first acts was to release political detainees, including captured CPP chairman Jose Maria Sison. Later, following talks with senior representatives of the communists' National Democratic Front, the government agreed to a sixty-day cease-fire, which ended in February 1987. The president also issued an executive order establishing the National Reconciliation and Development Program. The revived rebel amnesty program was inaugurated in January 1987 to encourage NPA defections by offering land, job training, and assimilation into society. The reconciliation approach was a disappointment to the government, however, as few insurgents surrendered. As a result, Aquino altered government strategy in March 1987 when she announced the "unleashing" of the military.


Following the 1986 change of government, the military resumed full-scale counterinsurgency operations with a new strategy known as Mamamayan, meaning people. Mamamayan was similar in most respects to the previous counterinsurgency, or COIN, plan, Marcos's Katatagan (stability), but added President Aquino's theme of reconciliation to the original program of "clear, hold, consolidate, and develop." The revised COIN plan called for military units, with the cooperation of other government agencies, to systematically clear areas of insurgents, to hold the region against returning guerrillas, to consolidate support for the government, and to develop the area economically. The first task--clearing rebel-infested areas--was seen as the task of mobile forces--the army battalions and constabulary special action forces. The role of holding and consolidating liberated regions was assigned to territorial forces--the constabulary, police, and militia units.


The updated counterinsurgency strategy was complemented by revamped armed forces tactics that were generally credited with contributing to the insurgency's decline during the late 1980s. Under Aquino, the military continued its shift away from conventional methods such as food blockades, cordon and search operations and hamletting (the forced relocation of villages controlled or threatened by the NPA). These methods, employed during the 1970s war against the Moros, were too often ineffective and counterproductive because they frequently alienated the populace. In other respects, the military's approach to COIN efforts changed little. Most military units operated as they had under Marcos, in static positions protecting town halls, businesses, and major roads.


The deployment of special operations teams beginning in 1987 and the formation of new militia units in 1988 were touted by military leaders as important steps toward more effective COIN. Special operations teams were squad-sized military counterinsurgency teams dispatched to CPP-influenced villages to dismantle the communists' political infrastructure by conducting civic action and propaganda programs. These teams worked in conjunction with the newly revamped militia, now called the Citizens Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGUs), to provide security to each remote barangay (see Glossary). The CAFGUs replaced the Civilian Home Defense Force, which was frequently criticized as abusive by human rights groups. Local anticommunist vigilante groups, some associated with the military, also proved effective deterrents to communist organizing and NPA activity in certain areas.
Improved military intelligence also played an important role in undercutting the insurgency in the late 1980s. Military intelligence agents repeatedly captured top CPP and NPA cadres and gathered revealing CPP and NPA documents. Rodolfo Salas, the CPP's former chairman, was among numerous central committee members rounded up. The fear of government intelligence penetrations of communist ranks contributed to devastating purges of rebel ranks between 1985 and 1988.


Perhaps the biggest contribution to the counterinsurgency campaign in the late 1980s was political, not military. Communist leaders admitted that Aquino, by restoring popular government and democratic institutions, significantly set back the revolutionary movement. Further civilian contributions in the fight against the communists were encouraged by the creation in 1987 of Peace and Order Councils. Established at all levels of government, the councils consisted of political and military leaders as well as selected community representatives and were charged with fostering greater civilian involvement and cooperation in what traditionally had been a military counterinsurgency struggle. A 1989 United States military study, however, concluded that the COIN effort remained largely a military effort despite the communist insurgency's political character.


Foreign and Filipino critics of the government's COIN program further alleged that the communist insurgency had endured for more than twenty years because the Philippines had not effectively addressed the social and cultural roots of the rural rebellion. The communist rebellion, it was said, was fed by the same social and economic inequities that had prompted previous peasant uprisings. The disparity between the small, but very wealthy, elite and the many impoverished was fundamental to the appeal of the revolutionary movement. Issues such as land reform resonated strongly among poor farmers, who also complained of abuses by landlords and politicians. Until such grievances were resolved, observers noted, they would continue to fuel insurgent activity in the country.

Carnelian International

RSOT: 2ID’s Cutting Edge



Col. Roger C. Diaz



CAMP CAPINPIN, Tanay, Rizal – The 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division under the command of MGen Efren L. Abu has effectively neutralized the communist terrorists’ plan to take control of the Southern Tagalog Region which is the gateway to Metro Manila, the seat of the national government. Realizing that it will still take many years to influence the whole of Luzon, the communist leader, Jose Ma. Sison tried a pole-vaulting strategy by concentrating his forces in CALABARZON hoping to constrict and eventually control Metro Manila. Sison failed miserably.



This is due to the relentless combat operations and highly effective intelligence and psychological operations by the three brigades under 2nd Infantry Division.



Playing a very crucial role in CMO and Psyops are the Reengineered Special Operations Teams (RSOT) which have been deployed since September last year in CT-affected barangays of the Southern Tagalog Region particularly CALABARZON which is the national priority area to regain the trust and confidence of the civilian populace through massive information campaign, civic action, and developmental poverty-alleviating projects. They are backed up by security teams that scour the areas to rid the barangays of armed groups extorting money from the poor people in the guise of “revolutionary taxes”.



On combat operations, the Jungle Fighters accounted for 91 government-initiated encounters which resulted to 257 firearms captured from the LCTM, 25 from lawless elements and Abu Sayaff Group, and the neutralization of 446 CTs. The division suffered insignificant losses in terms of calamities and materiel.



On intelligence operation, the Division’s deeply emplaced spies and the remarkable cooperation of sympathetic civilians coupled with the unwavering support of local government units (LGUs) and the Philippine National Police and other agencies of the government have caused the neutralization of the CTs’ top commanders the latest of whom were Ka Morris and Ka Enteng who vainly tried to resist the combined government forces and died in the ensuing firefight in November of last year.



At present, RSOT teams are deployed in the CT-affected barangays of Rizal, Batangas and Laguna. From September up to this date, these teams have already deinfluenced several barangays, dismantled two enemy fronts, and successfully caused the surrender of more than 315 Order of Battle-listed and high-ranking CT-personalities and sympathizers 150 of whom were personally welcomed by the President herself back to the fold of the law in a solemn and meaningful surrender ceremonies in Brgy. Pinugay, Baras, Rizal last November 15, 2002.The ceremonies were also attended by MGen. Roy Kyamko, commander, SOLCOM; MGen. Efren L. Abu, commanding general 2ID; Col. Efren P. Orbon, CO 202Bde, and other government officials like the secretary, DSWD, Dinky Soliman, Cong. Mike Defensor of Housing Development Authority and Gov. Rebecca “Nini" Ynarez of Rizal.



The latest 22 surrenderors coming from Pangil, Sta. Maria and Kalayaan all of Laguna were personally turned over by Col. Efren P. Orbon to Gov. Teresita ‘Ningning’ Lazaro in a solemn ceremony at the Provincial Capitol of Laguna last Feb. 14, 2003.



Having proven the indisputable effectiveness of the RSOT in neutralizing CPP/NPA/NDF leaders and their armed groups and in winning back the trust, confidence, and cooperation of the Filipino people in CT-affected area, MGen. Efren L. Abu, commanding general of the 2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division has ordered the training of more 2ID officers and NCOs in all brigades under his command.



P/Chief Supt. Enrique Galang, Regional Director of PRO 4 (CALABARZON) having realized the same also sent 42 policemen, four of whom are officers to undergo the same training at the RSOT Training Center in Sta. Cruz, Laguna being personally supervised by Colonel Orbon’s Deputy Brigade Commander, Col. Roger C. Diaz, the former Deputy G7 and Group Commander of the Philippine Army’s premier Psychological Operations Unit, the Civil Affairs Group.



The Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force, MGen. Nestor Santillan believes as well in the potency of RSOT in effectively breaking the backbone of the CPP/NPA. He also sent one team (9 EP) from the 740th Combat Group, PAF under LTC Romeo Poquis based in Nasugbu, Batangas to undergo RSOT training.



As a result, with the combined forces of the AFP, PNP and the LGUs now at the heels of the communist terrorists, it will just be a matter of time before the CPP/NPA finally crumble to the ground. Only one crucial element is needed: The Filipino people’s complete trust and cooperation. With the RSOT teams bringing hope, enlightenment, and life to the communities even in the most remote barangays, this doesn’t seem to be a difficult task at all.

Hurrah! RSOT :fire:

The disparity has widened further - has this resulted also to the increase of NPA fighters?

Really? So where did the NePs get their non-AFP issue firearms, from the Chinks? :drunk:

baka sa danao..

Some M-14s seized from local rebels are Norinco made.
The CPP-NPA even have a squad automatic weapon derived from the M-14 with a stretched magazine. They also do- acquire weapons from the MILF like anti-vehicle mines and RPG-2 clones.

The AFP even captured an NPA weapons factory in Paluan town, Occidental Mindoro during the incumbency of then Governor Villarosa.
Governor Villarosa has been suspected of forging a tactical alliance with the local NPA and uses them to assasinate enemies like the killing of several AFP officers and ambush attempts on the new governor then congresswoman Sato.

Mga 204 BDe soldiers, I know you are aware of these.

Delivered by Chinese trawlers transferred to motorized bancas.
:demon:

:armyeek: bakit di ba sila na intercept ng navy ships natin?

the MV Karagatan was intercepted.. and many of the M14s of the AFP are from this interception.

WHAT A CONCISE INFO! :thumb:

That article from Carnelian International is correct.

We should address the root causes of these unrest and rebellion.

What the military is doing is just keeping the effects of these problems in a manageable level if not totally eliminating the same to allow the programs of the government to win these desperate Filipinos back to the mainstream.

The less hyndrance these programs get, the earlier it will bring forth good results.

NPA getting bigger?

With the effects of the worsening economic condition, i should believe so.

Surprisingly, the govt particularly the military has already realized the importance of winning the sympathy of the masses.

As i see it, though some are still being recruited, their number has not really grown.

THE DECIDING FACTOR TO THESE UNREST AND REBELLION LIES IN GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM IN ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF THESE;

POVERTY, CORRUPTION AND INJUSTICE.

I''d wish the amiable Col. Daniel Lucero would say that in the media!

di po yun trabaho ng military.. dapat diyan sisihin ang mga civilan department

Right!


You leave that part to the civilians, ...........the government to be precise.

Palpak na man ang sibilyan sa wholistic approach sa COIN dahil NANANAKAW malaking bahagi ng buwis. Huge revenue lossess because of corruption in the revenue collection process plus more revenue lossess because collected taxes is further eroded by corrupt officials involved in government expenditures.

BULLS-EYE !


:exactly:


Nonetheless, pagtulungan na natin na mawala itong katiwalian o mabawasan pa.

See how complicated this COIN's concern is?

Pag pumalpak tayo sa isang factor ay walang saysay lahat maski ... MAGANDA ANG PERFORMANCE NG AFP.

:whogives:

:agree:

Actually they are trawlers from the Philippines bought by the NEPS from a salvage yard in Navotas and rehab in Bulacan.

NO WONDER WALA NA SI KA ROGER SA CALABARZON?

It's good that the AFP has realized the CMO concept and PsyOps.

Isn't it that this CMO thing was started during the administration of Marcos?

Is the RSOT concept being used in areas other than CALABARZON?
How about in the 8ID in Samar? It seems the reds are gaining a resurgence there.

http://news.inq7.net/regions/index.php?ind...&story_id=15127

Basilan sheds off its image as Abu-Sayyaf ravaged island

Updated 11:35pm (Mla time) Oct 16, 2004
Inquirer News Service



Editor's Note: Published on page A17 of the October 17, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer

MALUSO, Basilan, Philippines -- US Ambassador to the Philippines Francis Ricciardone noted the transformation of this province from an Abu Sayyaf-ravaged island to a growing economic hub in Mindanao.

"From the looks of it, Basilan is transformed. That's what we have hoped, a combination of development assistance, working with the local government units, government agencies, non-government organizations and with the wise work of the AFP that judiciously used their force against the bad elements," Ricciardone told reporters here Wednesday.

The US ambassador visited Maluso town where a port improvement is being implemented by the Growth Equity in Mindanao (GEM) thru USAID funding.

"The economy is coming up. Projects like these are intended to connect the islands, to connect the economy and the people prosper," he said.

Carlos Tan, the GEM's deputy program manager on infrastructure, told the Inquirer that their projects are focused mostly on conflict affected areas in Mindanao, particularly in the
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Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Andrew Nastios, the USAID administrator, said Basilan has the biggest share of GEM-USAID community level projects in Mindanao. Of the 700 projects introduced and accomplished, Basilan got 200.

"We are here to emphasize this pledge and help to the Philippine government and help them to stabilize peace," Nastios said.

Gov. Wahab Akbar said the province has placed 18th nationwide for revenue collection this year.

"We have been tagged before as the 20th poorest province in the country. Now we are surviving and growing," Akbar said.

ARMM Gov. Parouk Hussin also said that ARMM, known for its negative image as the "most troubled spot in the country, has become one of the provinces with the lowest crime rate based on the statistics of the Philippine National Police."

Julie Alipala, Inquirer Mindanao Bureau

=================================================


AFP and PNP ensuring security and peace...

...while the civil society doing the bigger part. :exactly:

Gov't can defeat communist, Islamic militants in 10 years: official
05/19 5:16:48 PM

MANILA (AFP) - The Philippines can rid itself of a 36-year-old communist insurgency as well as smaller Muslim extremist groups in six to 10 years, Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz has said.

"The (armed forces of the Philippines) can defeat the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) in six to 10 years," Cruz said in a speech late Wednesday, copies of which were released later.

He later added that the Al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf and other groups affiliated with the Jemaah Islamiyah network could also be eliminated within that period.

Cruz said the military is adopting a multi-year program to upgrade its capability.

This program will receive a one-billion-peso (18.34-million-US dollar) allocation and is hoping to get more assistance from foreign allies, Cruz said.

"Aside from this funding, the defense department is also looking for other sources of funding to ensure the continuity until the objective is attained," Cruz said.

Part of the program includes professionalizing the rank and file of the military and better equipment for soldiers on the frontline. It will also cover the building of roads to far-flung, rural villages which are hotbeds of the insurgency.

The 8,000-strong NPA, the armed wing of the CPP, has been waging a Maoist armed struggle for a communist state in the hinterlands of the country for the past 36 years.

Peace talks between Manila and the rebels were indefinitely suspended in August last year after the communist insurgents charged that the Philippine government was not doing enough to get their group removed from US and European lists of "terrorist" organizations.

Aside from the communists, the Philippine government is dealing with various Muslim separatist groups in the southern third of the country such as the Abu Sayyaf, blamed for the worst-ever militant attack in the Philippines.

Both Washington and Manila have linked the Abu Sayyaf to the Al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden.

The government has sealed a truce and opened peace talks with the main Muslim separatist group, the 12,000-strong Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) but the Abu Sayyaf and other Muslim armed groups are not covered by the truce.

Military officials have charged that the MILF is harboring members of the Jemaah Islamiyah within their camps in the southern Philippines but the government has said that peace talks will continue.

http://www.philstar.com/philstar/NEWS_FLAS...20051347_15.htm

This funding could help to upgrade the education of our intelligence community, if this will not slip into the pockets of the corrupt military bigwigs. :exactly:

:agree: Totoo 'yan TOPP. Let's just hope and pray for the best :thumb:

National Defense Secretary Avelino Cruz Jr. has announced that the AFP will defeat the insurgency elements of the country in six to ten years. Is this possible? We have learned in the past that wars have no permanent timetables. Our problem is worse than Vietnam. And Cruz said that P1 billion will be alloted for this final campaign. What the hell is he talking about? We need more than that to defeat a 30-year old insurgency! :crazy: