From our PASR forum as originally posted by Capt. Cabunoc:

It is always said that the best SOP for ambush is to avoid getting ambushed. Easier said than done. Yes, we have an SOP for this. Bottomline: WALANG IWANAN!!!! Rangers do not leave a fallen comrade to the hands of the enemy. Kung nauubos ang baril ng naambus at kanya-kanyang balik sa kampo ang survivors na sundalo, me problema tayo dyan.

If the Philippine Army leadership is indeed serious in studying the "tactical errors" (whatever you term it) committed by our soldiers in the field, perhaps these horrible incidents can be minimized. Let me cite some of the ambushes executed by the enemy:

---Bicol incident involving the troops under the 9th ID (2003 or early 2004?) which led to the capture of a 2LT and an EPand the killing of others
---- Davao ambush of SF troopers which left many soldiers dead and wounding of many others including an officer
---- The ambush of 75IB somewhere in Davao del Sur. My uncle, a CPT was involved during that incident. Nag "run for your life" ang kanyang PL at iniwan sya sa ambush site
---- The ambush of 204th Bde troops in Mindoro which led to the wounding of COL PALPARAN
---- The ambush of 33IB troops in Pansol, Patikul, Sulu which led to the recovery of 60mm mortar and the killing of 1 soldier
----- The ambush of 32nd IB in Tipo-tipo Basilan which led to more than 5 KIA
----- The ambush of 18IB in Bohe Bessey, Tuburan Basilan which led to the killing of 4 soldiers and wounding of 1 officer
---- The ambush of 77IB in Luba Hill, Patikul, Sulu which led to the killing of a 2LT and about 5 of his troops
--- The ambush of 59IB in Lubuk, Talipao,Sulu in Sept 2000 which led to 1KIA and wounding of others
--- The ambush of 4th IB in Luba Hill, Patikul, Sulu which resulted to 6KIA
--- Ambush of 32nd SF Coy in Pampangan, Lantawan in 2000 which led to more than 10 KIA and wounding of 1 officer (Lets not forget this atrocity of the ASG wherein the dead troopers were decapitated)
---- The ambush of 2SRBn convoy somewhere in Indanan, Sulu by the ASG which led the wounding of some personnel including the BATCOM himself
---- The ambush of 73IB by Parago sometime in 1999. Di ba "run for your life" ang nangyari sa kanila?
---- Ambush of 1SRBn in Pampangan, Lantawan Basilan in July 2000 which led to 6KIA (all 19SRC) and wounding of 2 officers (same place as 32nd SF)
--- The ambush of 4SRC somewhere in Davao early this year which resulted to 1 KIA
--- Talayan incident involving the troops of 2SRBn sometime in 1999 which led to the wounding of some soldiers and an "unforgettable" experience for CPT FOINX, my mistah
----Maraming-marami pang iba na naitala sa ating history. Di siguro natatake note ng maayos kasi talo. Sa NPA Combat Scoreboard siguro, naka emphasize yan. And now, we have this ambush of 56IB troops with 10KIA and 19FAs recovered by the enemy!

In my own observation , dalawang factors ang dapat ma-correct ng PA leadership: COMBAT LEADERSHIP and TRAINING OF OUR UNITS. If unit leaders fail during difficult tactical situations such an ambush scenario, siguradong wipe out ang abutin. AYAW LANG KASING TANGGAPIN AT ILABAS ANG KATOTOHANAN NA NAGTAKBUHAN AT NAG-IIWANAN SA GYERA ANG IBANG LINE UNITS NATIN. SA INFANTRY BATTALIONS NANGYAYARI ITO. I HAVENT HEARD A SCOUT RANGER UNIT NA GINAWANG NAG-IWANAN. THATS THE REASON WHY DI TAYO NA-WIPE OUT SA AMBUSHES NA NA-EXPERIENCE NATIN. Probable reason? As I said, leadership. Pag mawalan ng control ang leader (officer and NCOs), watak-watak ang tropa kaya kinakawawa ng kalaban (NPA or muslim rebels)! Dapat, makatotohanan sana ang Board of Inquiry at mag-come up sila ng corrective measures at develop new SOPs/TTPs para maiwasan ang kasindak-sindak na pangyayaring ito. Can't we do it? We must remember, the NPA is doing it. We have recovered documents in Mindoro and in Laguna which detailed their studies on their past tactical errors.

Meanwhile, napabayaan naman talaga ang training ng units natin especially sa Infantry Battalion. For compliance ang retraining nila. Kung kulang sa training, of course walang confidence ang tropa at iyon ang isa sa dahilan na natatalo sa mga engkwentro.

I don't have the monopoly of ideas to solve these woes of our organization but let me express my honest opinion that we are not heading towards right direction. Despite the fact that we are confronting problems like this, the Philippine Army is making the Light Armor Brigade a division unit as if we are confronting tank units of the enemy! Palagay ko, we should have invested on the the proper training and equippage of our infantry units especially the SOCOM units. What they did instead? Pinaliit ang FSRR at Special Forces!!!! To compare it, sa US Army, pinalaki nila ang SOF dahil sa situation sa Iraq and Afghanistan. Sa atin, baligtad ang nangyayari. Of course, they can come up with a "valid reason" to justify this action. Kaya nga matatalino sila eh.

NOTE: I have intentionally enumerated some of the ambush scenarios na nangyari from 1995-2004 na meron akong knowledge sa nangyari. Lets compare the fatalities incurred by SR units and other units. Parehong ambush lahat yan..Bakit nawa-wipe out ang iba? Balik tayo sa 2 factors na sinabi ko. Kung di ko nakuha ang exact figures ng fatalities, estimated ko na lang.

Philippine Army Scout Rangers

totoo ba talaga to?.. :armyeek:

Studying past tactical errors?

That's what most soldiers and analysts have been pointing out.

I wonder why they cant work on that one right? :dunno:

It seems like they aren't learning from their mistakes.

The military must take note of the fact that the rebels are learning from their experience that's why they can still kill a truckload of soldiers.

Expect more of these losses unless the military starts changing or improving their tactics.

totoo yan, sa SR walang iwanan, patay na kung patay.di sila madaling aatras sa bakbakan maski outnumbered. they are trained to be prepared for the worse case scenario.

We must not forget that the biggest factor, as what Capt. Cabunoc mentioned, points to ...

... LEADERSHIP.

:agree:

Kung mahina sa planning, tactic at motivational skills ang leader, eh malamang tatakbuhan pa sya ng ka-tropa nya.

:dunno:

Guys,

I really suggest that you confer to Capt Cabunoc about quoting his email post from PASR to this site. I think its out of courtesy if not op security of the PASR threads.

If done so before this email, then i think its ok.

In reference to the good capt.'s statements, it is sad to know that line units are doing so. I reckon the reason why the Divisions are establishing recon Coy/Bn as to mitigate this matter. The problem is that division recon units do not have as tight unit integrity or something close as the SR units. They should send their units as whole and do at least SROC training. The PAF 740th did exactly that and look at their accomplishments in SOLCOM.

Even SR units retrain as a huge as battalion level to implement unit integrity. I heard that the 3SRBN went through this phase after the SR realignment (a.k.a downsizing).

So, Scout Ranges are more professionaly trained in combat than any other soldiers in the AFP??

Why not make it a standard training of all our soldiers specially in the ARMY the way a Scout Ranger trained in combat in order for the regular soldier of AFP attain the highest level of skill in combat like a Scout Ranger? Just asking. Peace to all.

That will be almost impossible, a huge majority of SR candidates fail the SR course, while the army training system is compelled to churn out numbers as per TOE requirements.

not a good idea, that would make each and every member of the Army an ELITE SOLDIER ... :demon:

thank god its practically impossible ... :bow:

Gentlemen, we dont really need to "Scout Rangerize" the whole AFP to solve this tactical problem.

"React to ambush" is one of the battle drills that should be learned by all infantry soldiers (including the marines). Unfortunately, most of our line units are deficient with this "basic" skill. Our unit commanders turn a blind eye on the problem and focus on body counts (remember the bodycount syndrome by the Americans in Vietnam?) without taking giant leaps to counter this problem. Let us take a closer look at what happened to MBLT5. Meron napugutan ng ulo sa mga tropa na nakasakay sa Humvee na syang lead vehicle during their movement. Kung nagawan sana nila ng paraan na makapag provide ng effective base of fire ang least engaged elements (who were aboard the M35 truck), di sana mapugutan ng ulo ang magigiting nating tropa. This is almost the same scenario (though foot ambush) that happened to 23MC (if im not mistaken) troops who were massacred by the ASG/MNLF in Luba Hill near Kantatang, Maligay, Sulu in 2002.

We should come up with TTPs to counter-ambush scenario depending on METTT-C considerations that would make every TTP unique to every situation.

If we tend to refuse to acknowledge that we have a certain problem, we can never find the appropriate solution.

Let us take these painful lessons seriously to improve our capabilities and continue to win the countless battles that are still to come.

NOTE:


Some guys from the "foxhole" say that there is a jinx in Luba Hill. Many of our brave soldiers paid the ultimate sacrifice in this area. To the fallen heroes of the PMC, 77IB, 4IB and 7IB------youre heroic deeds will never be forgotten.