What in your opinion should be the ideal size, structure and doctrine of the Philippine Army?

General assumption: You have the power to rebuild the PA from scratch but funding is in accordance with current realities.

Philipine Light Infantry Battallion (Reinforced)


Headquarters & Service Support Coy
-Recon & Sniper plt
-serving as eyes and ears of Bn CO
-Fire Support Liasons plt
-serving as artillery spotters,Forward Air Controllers
-H&S would also consist of all other components necessaary to keep Bn
running in a day to day basis(admin,supply,armorer etc)

3 Rifle Coy

Rifle coy would consist of
-H&s plt(charge of running coy day to day ops)
-3 rifle plt consisting of
*3 rifle squad with following personnel and weapons
>squad Leader(m4 rifle),Grenadier(m16w 203) automatic gunner(m249 SAW)
assistant automatic gunner(M16 with extra ammo and barrel for SAW)3
Rifleman(M16)designated marksman (PMC sniper rifle)
>2 soldiers on each squad should carry LAWs
-Weapons Plt
-mortar squad
-3 60mm mortars(3 soldiers on each gun)
-machinegun squad
-3 M60 MGs (3 soldiers on each gun)
-assualt squad
-3 SMAWS
>assualt squad should also be trained with demolitions

Weapons Coy
- Mortar Plt
-6 81mm mortar (6 soldiers each gun) and a Fire Direction Center (6 soldiers)
>2 guns in support of ea rifle coy
-Heavy Machinegun plt
-3 50cal MGs ( 5 soldiers each gun)
-3 Mk19 Automatic Grenade Luancher(5 soldiers ae gun)
>1 MG & 1 AGL in support of ea rifle coy
-Assualt and Demo Plt
-6 TOW missile launcher
>2 launchers in support of ea rifle coy
>also trained in demolitions

Battallion Support Coy(this coy is made up of personnel from other components
of service)
-Armrored plt
-6 Armored Personnel Carrier
>in support of 1st coy operations
-Smallcraft Plt
-6 Patrol Boat River(PBRs)
-12 Zodiacs
>in support of 2nd coy operations
-PAF liason plt
-liason personnel in support of 3rd coys airborne and heliborne ops

Each Coy would have a different specialty
*1st coy would specialise in urban warfare and would also serve as
the mechanized coy
*2nd coy would specialize in amphibious and riverine operations
*3rd coy would specialize in airborne and heliborne operations
*Wpns coy individuals guns would be trained with the same specializations
as the coy theyre supporting
*even though ea coy has its own specialazation they are crosstrained to do
ea others mission
*in addition to ea coys specialization theyre are also trained in mountain operations
(rappelling,abseiling etc)
The battallion is mostly trained in small unit tactics and operations(squad to coy size)



The PA should concentrate on being active on combat patrols and be able to reinforced its patrols quicky if it comes in contact with the enemy(mobility).Be able to exploit the enemies weakness(no air support) no indirect fire support)and relentleslly chase the enemy all over the countryside.PA should concentrate on small unit tactics(squad to coy Platoon size) since the enemy normally operate on this size.PA units should perfect the execution of its immediate action drills,should be proficient in calling in fire support and be able to gain fire superiority in a firefigth



PS
man i had fun doing this its seems like a good plan but u know what they say the first cassualty in a firefight is ur plan

in the original PA modernization plan, the army was supposed to be reorganized, in to:

*3 full infantry divisions(one in luzon, visayas, mindanao)-10,000 soldiers each division, each with its full complement of; engineering, armored, aviatin, andti-air, and artillery regiments.

*8 rapid deployment brigades, around 3,000 soldiers in each brigade. each brigade to replace the current 8, 5,000-man divisions of today. rapid deployment and interoperability capability. has supporting engineering/armoredair/anti-air /artillery battaliion.

*aviation wing for the army to include attack/reconnaisance/utility helicopters and maybe observation aircraft in the form of cessnas and UAVs.

*armored brigade, based in central luzon and transport capable.

only one armored brigade proposed and based in c. luzon, why not make it two - one for luzon and one for mindanao

Section TO&E of German Army light infantry for comparison against PA equivalent size unit:


Section leader with MP7 (4.6 x 30mm PDW)
3 riflemen with G-36 rifles fitted with AG-36 grenade launchers
4 riflemen with G-36 rifles
2 MG with MG-4 (as per Minimi)

Section also has
8 NSA80 II weapon sights
2 PAS-13A thermal sights
2 Panzerfaust LAAW launchers (6 rockets total?). This is an improved version, ISTR 900mm penetration. Also a disposable LAW version is under development.
All have individual radios, GPS, improved body armour and Lucie NVG

The Philippine Army should have a size of 567,000 troops, organized into 68 divisions (each division with 5796 men) together with support and supply units. The Army should be divided into 12 regions, with a corps of 5 of more divisions in each:

Northern Luzon
Central Luzon
Southern Luzon
Eastern Luzon
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
Western Mindanao
Central Mindanao
Southern Mindanao
Eastern Mindanao
Metro Manila

Included in the 567,000 troops are 12,000 scout rangers and other special forces.

:snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo:

Semper Fidelis et Paratus

Five (5) infantry division in Metro Manila?

I gets. One infantry division each for: Manila and Caloocan; Makati and Pasay City; San Juan and Mandaluyong; Pasig and Quezon City; and Paranaque and Muntinglupa. Let me guess, they are there to complement and support the five infantry divisions in Central Luzon and the other five divisions in Southern Luzon in case they run into trouble. Right?

Our barangay captain can request one infantry company and a ranger team to defend my subdivision. We can place a platoon at every gate. The rangers can stay in the park.

Can we have tanks and artillery too?

:armycheers:

Pendejo, :armyLol:

why don't we shift back to BCT or reactivate BCT's to eliminate the communist threat... and retain some division in mindanao...

just asking.. :specool:

Pendejo, the 5 or more divisions also stand for the number of the types of divisions we should have:

Light Infantry Division
Mechanized Infantry Division
Airborne Infantry Division (with at least 2 helicopter groups)
Field Artillery Division
Armored Cavalry Division (anti-coup)

:snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo:

Semper Fidelis et Paratus

The ultimate in home defense. :drunk:

Oh my, you guys are ready to pay 20% VAT and 50% tax rates! Or maybe lets introduce mandatory conscription.

Oh, I stand corrected... no engineers? Why so few soldiers? :drunk:

based on what threat assumptions?

Pendejo, the engineers are part of the rest of the 567,000 troops who are in a supporting role. They aren't counted in the combat units. Few soldiers can help the taxpayers. And fewer, professional soldiers are better than a magnitude of draftees.

:snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo:

Semper Fidelis et Paratus

:exactly:

How do you suggest the Philippines will pay for all those troops?

Well, adroth, for starters we must increase our military budget from 1.5% of our GDP to at least 5%.

:snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo:

Semper Fidelis et Paratus

What effect do you such a shift in priorities will have on the country as a whole?

Why "5%"?

Why not 4%? Why not 6%?

Who would such a large force fight?

Our country's most important priority must be national defense and security. It should have a substantial share in the national budget. 5% up to 10% must be alloted for the military. It needs the money badly for research and development, logistics, salaries, and acquisition.

:snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo: :snipemo:

Semper Fidelis et Paratus

So does education which I believe should get a bigger chunk of the budget. For a whole generation at least.

Pardon my ignorance on military affairs but my simple mind cannot see how 5 army divisions in Metro Manila will not be a waste of resources.

'tis like securing your house in B.F. Homes with a Howitzer battery when a security guard with a shotgun will do.

Well said, Pendejo.

I would wish for a smaller, lighter and meaner AFP. That can deal with multiple fronts that concerns domestic or local issues. I would like to exploit the nautical highway that had been established not only for domestic use but also for military purpose. I would rather have the PMC permanently based in Mindanao to confront muslim secessionists. I would like for the Army and Airforce ground pounders to deal with the commie and deal with them well.The provinces around metro manila I would like for the PNP-SAF to handle the reds so as to commit the armed forces troops to far flung places and get the reds busy.
So far in the last year the communists had been concentrating in planting landmines and ambushcades.They already are very limited in trying to conduct conventional offensives such as base (detachments and other outposts) harassments.The communists as of now are very much concentrating their efforts in propaganda since they are still trying to recuperate from setsbacks dealt to them by the AFP.The communists have resorted in killing their own militants in the mass base groups and blame those to the military.

A leaner and meaner AFP will be light enough to be transported and flown to other areas of conflicts.By having a smaller group will be able to commit budget for better training and better equipments. A better trained forces will be able to deliver a good amount of misery to the enemy.
The other reason that I wanted the Marines to be in Mindanao, is that only the muslim rebels has the capacity to launch a conventional armed struggle against the goverment hence the Marines are well versed to conventional and also unconventional tactics of the enemy. :armygrin:

A lean organization cannot guarantee a victory, since lean organizations lack superior firepower and superiority by numbers. You need the massive force when dealing with smaller adversaries. :sniper:

Well the trend now is to be lean but fully equipped units. Countries now invest on the latest technology. Highly mobilized that can be shifted from one area to another. But still this is being challenged with recent conflicts.

Other countries especially those not having internal security problems could afford to buy those latest tech equipments.

As for us and most third world countries, it's cheaper to go to manpower. Sad though at the expense of our soldiers.

I still say that we must not forget the traditions of the past, when armies against armies shaped the world. :tomcat:

Hence the word "Lean"
The key to a victory on a conventional warfare is "surprise" same principle as with guerrilla warfare. A General with a mindset of only on quantity will bound to loose his edge if he does not exploit the capacity of his well equipped and well trained troops.
An army who can gain the upperhand with the use of stealth,technology and superb tactic will still be able to incapacitate or annihilate an enemy despite their lack of numbers against a superior numerical enemy force.
Gone are the days were conventional forces will have to meet toe to toe to wage war.Tradition dictates to never fight fair in the field of battle inorder to win.
What matters more is the one who is left standing after the chaos of war had died down. Smart thinking will help you live thereby making better judgement to help your troops live. Smart tactics will obliterate your enemy thereby it will make you a victor. Numbers in this time in age does not mean squat if you dont have the edge. China is slowly learning this principle that is why they are slowly scaling their number of forces down. Smaller in size of your forces does not mean a handful.Tradition is good but there are other traditions that are better left in peoples memory.The new age of war had come and if we continue to maintain traditions that does not agree with the present, you are bound to be left behind. In the business of war being left behind with strategies,tactics and doctrine makes you and your forces obsolete, therefore it is easy for them to kill you.

So we should really be shaping our forces to undertake police action?

Lean and Mean can be dictated by terrain size/features of a country and its internal security-policing issues. A country whose police forces are overcommitted to undertake large scale internal security operations will usually illicit the support or transfer that role to its armed forces.

If you actually make accounts and tally about our external defense capability in terms of roles commited to external defense tasks, we are actually "lean but not mean".

Yes sir police action, you call it what you may. Thats what they call the Korean war as a police action. Indeed a massive police action I mean everything was just thrown in the AO except the atomic bomb.

The fact of the matter is that clearly and presently the country's main threat is the 2 front insurgency. It is pulling our economy downwards, our countryside is neglected due to war.If you may police action might be suited to such situation but if you want to look closely even the police have harder time catching crooks

Hey I completely agree 100%. What bothered me though is the idea of placing the PMC for police action in Mindanao, I do not mind focused roles for police actions by the PMC and its FR but a large AOR for the PMC alone.

If we have remaining units that is still capable of employing a good punch for external defense roles, its the PMC I would not even count the PA divisions or PAF SpOW mainly bec they are tied in police actions and have no assets for permanent disposition even more for quick reaction.

The PMC needless to say is the AFPs first line of defense against external threats on land. Its employment can speed up the defense of a threatened Army Division or Area Command. Further our archepelagic nature demands that the PMC to step on such plate.

With quantity comes a decline in quality, which is why modern armies employ force multipliers (e.g., tanks, technology, etc.).

This is also the reason why conscription is no longer considered a viable option for a truly modern army.

how about adopting the Commando BattleGroup proposed by Victor Corpuz for external defense... it's viable and can defeat a superpower in case of an invasion... it focus on unconventional warfare and invisibility as defense against external :specool: aggressor

As I understand it, Victor Corpuz's strategy was to make occupation of the Philippines a very expensive proposition. I'm not a military strategist; so I honestly can't imagine how such a method can be conducted or sustained.

With that strategy however, I seriously doubt that the Philippines will continue to exist as a unified entity after the occupying power leaves. Since the individual regions will be responsible for conducting their own military operations, I doubt if the muslim areas will allows themselves to fall under the control of a Manila government that failed to protect them. Another possible outcome: Cebu might secede from the republic and declare independence.

how about changing RUC into Area Command like the present set-up in the AFP?

On a micro scale, the squad and platoon...

The basic infantry squad could be reorganized based on the USMC 13-man squad, which has 3 x 4-man fire teams and a squad leader.
With modifications, such a 13-man squad would have:

1 x squad leader (rifle)

Fire Team A and B, each with:
- team leader (rifle)
- grenadier (rifle+M203)
- LSW gunner (HBar rifle* fed by hi-capacity mags)
- rifleman/scout (rifle + shotgun or SG module)

Fire Team C
- team leader (rifle)
- designated marksman (7.62 semiauto sniper rifle or MSSR-type)
- machine gunner (7.62 GPMG)
- assistant gunner (rifle)

(*-‘Auto rifle’ vs. 5.56 LMG discussed in this USMC article: part1, part2. Such an HBar rifle could be a modified M16 maybe locally developed or an LSW version of a new rifle. Also from that article, the experiment there of putting all of a squad’s SAWs in one FT is substituted above by having a GPMG+DM combo FT.)

A platoon would have 3 such squads plus a small platoon HQ section (platoon commander would be a 1LT; a greenhorn 2LT starts out as a deputy pn cmdr; plus there’s the platoon sgt and radio operator; consequently, a company is commanded by a major, with a captain his deputy).

In standard config, each squad would thus have 2 relatively lightly armed but highly mobile all-rifle fire teams plus 1 less mobile but more heavily armed ‘weapons fire team’. As the mission or tactical conditions dictate, the squad formations above would be modular too. For example, the first 2 squads could each swap their 3rd fire team [C] for the 3rd squad’s first 2 fire teams (A&B) – thus, there’ll be 2 x 13-man all-rifle squads and 1 x 13-man fire support squad w/ 3 weapons fire teams. Or, all 3 squads could lose their 3rd fire teams and have these concentrated under platoon command (dep pn cmdr or pn sgt) – thus, there’ll be 3 x 9-man all-rifle squads and 1 x weapons section (3 teams of GPMGs and marksmen) under the platoon sgt or deputy pn cmdr. Standard config, or mix and match where advantageous.

Assault weapon teams, forward observers, medics, and others could be attached to the platoon from the company’s weapons platoon and pertinent units.

Where shall we get all the lieutenants to lead the platoons. Currently the army has a shortage of 800 lieutenants.

tirad: why replace 5.56 LMGs with 7.62 GPMGs? wouldn't the added weight and ammo considerations - plus the need for an assistant gunner - detract from the advantages of the 2 AR + 1 LMG fire team concept? - your LMG FT is down to only one LMG, shouldn't everyone there be hefting LMGs (though i'm wondering why no consideration to DMs was given, the subject of another test?) and why only 1 "true" AR (LSW) per AR team?

nevertheless, great read! :fire:

Oh, wasn't aware of that. But, are you sure, a shortage of 800 lieutenants?

If there are at least 81 platoons in a division, not counting recon and support units, ergo 800 missing lieutenants divided by 81 pn per Div, you mean we have more than 9 divisions running around without platoon commanders?

The general idea behind a 1st Lt. as platoon cmdr with a 2nd Lt. as a 'deputy' pn cmdr, is that 1) a freshly minted, very inexperienced 2LT won't have the lives 40-50 men in his hands right away, and 2) instead of being bumped up to company HQ, a more experienced 1LT would be able to put experience to use in leading a platoon, while the 2LT, as he once was too, learns the ropes.

Assuming, of course, there are enough lieutenants.

You bet your mess cut.

Platoons are being led by NCOs. On the bright side, the practice has it's merits in combat since a seasoned NCO can do wonders in combat that a wet behind the ears second camote cannot do. Infantry battalions based on TOE should have a complement of 32-33 officers. In reality, a battalion has 12 officers on a good day. Contrast that to the air force combat groups (battalion equivalent) which operate with a full complement of officers. Some air force combat groups have 35 officers.

But have no fear, we have plenty of Generals! They are so many Adroth has his arms and legs full tracking all of them.

Here are extracts from Transforming, Not Reforming, the AFP
by Colonel Ricardo C. Morales, published in 2003.

x-x-x

From the halcyon era of the ‘70s when the ratio was a heavenly 7:1, the number of enlisted personnel in proportion to officers steadily increased to 13: 1 in 2000. The Philippine Army table of organization prescribes a ratio of 10:1 . This ratio was broken in 1975-1980 when Army strength leaped 167% but officer strength only grew a modest 16%. Officer training never caught up with soldier training.

Several corrective measures were attempted. During the early 1990’s the Army tried to remedy the shortage by expediently shifting technical officers – engineers and signalers - to the infantry branch. This further complicated the problem because it weakened the losing branches and provided sub-optimal contributions to the gaining branch (infantry). These transferees were not trained for infantry jobs. In 2002 the CSAFP directed that all newly commissioned officers in the Air Force and Navy serve a few years with the Army. For reasons still unclear, this directive was never implemented .

Amazingly, in a clear demonstration of a self-inflicted damage, the Army shut down the only other alternative to training more officers – its NCO academy. In 1991, the then CG, PA, in a typical knee-jerk impulse, ordered the school closed because of a hazing case. Already suffering a lack of officers, the Army further deprived itself of the only other source to augment its company-level leadership gap. The school would only reopen in 2001.

In mid-2002, a plan was hatched in GHQ to increase the Army by 20,000 more personnel. This plan does not include provisions for officers. If a sensible ratio would be maintained, this increase would require at least 1,800 more officers. The AFP does not have the capacity to produce this number of officers. The PMA produces only about 87 a year for the Army and the other officer sources another 88 – in a good year – for an annual average of 175 . In short, these additional 20,000 soldiers will be an unsupervised and un-led rabble. It will have dire consequences on our society.

The lack of officers is most severely felt at the company level – lieutenants – who are the doers and war fighters of any army. In 2002 the Army was suffering from a 2Lt shortage of about 700, and the figure was increasing. Many rifle companies had only two officers; very few had three or more. During that time no major reconfiguration of the officer procurement process has been done to remedy the shortage . The severe shortage of officers results in unaccomplished or poorly performed missions, abuses and a general breakdown in discipline and efficiency. All of the solutions adapted proved inadequate and temporary. The Army, by neglecting its leader-to-follower ratio to deteriorate, has not done the thing right.

x-x-x

We can get new infantry officers by activating some ROTC graduates and promoting the profession of arms through media and propaganda in order to acquire more aspiring officer-candidates. :crawling: